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Note 
Is Groundwater that Is Hydrologically Connected 
to Navigable Waters Covered Under the CWA?: 
Three Theories of Coverage & Alternative 
Remedies for Groundwater Pollution 
Allison L. Kvien* 
The Clean Water Act (CWA) makes it illegal for facilities, 
like a mining operation, to discharge pollutants into traditional 
“navigable waters,” such as the Mississippi River, without a 
permit.1 While it is undeniable that the CWA protects against 
this direct discharging of pollutants into navigable waters, the 
CWA’s jurisdiction becomes a little murkier when the dumping 
is less direct. For instance, if a mining operation instead 
created a large basin to dump its pollutants into, and those 
pollutants seeped through the soil into groundwater connected 
to and flowed into the river, would it be covered under the 
CWA? Since both of these circumstances achieve the same 
result—that the navigable water is polluted—it seems odd to 
say that the mining operation would need a permit to discharge 
its pollutants in the first circumstance, but not the second. 
Federal courts, however, are in disagreement on this issue.2 
Can the CWA cover discharges of pollutants to groundwater 
that is hydrologically connected to navigable waters? 
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 1. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012); id. § 1362(12) (2012). 
 2. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 10; discussion infra Part I.C.; cases 
cited infra Appendix A. 
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The CWA was enacted in 1972 in order to “restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters.”3 The CWA significantly revised and enhanced 
federal regulatory powers for controlling pollution to water; 
and given the difficulties in enforcing the 1948 Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act4 and the 1965 Water Quality Act,5 the 
CWA can be considered the first comprehensive national water 
pollution law that was passed and enacted in the United 
States.6 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the 
EPA share enforcement authority under the CWA.7 While it is 
certain that the CWA was intended to cover “navigable 
waters,”8 defined as “waters of the United States,” the CWA 
does not express its authority on groundwater. Although courts 
and the EPA agree that isolated groundwater9 is not covered by 
                                                          
 3. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
 4. Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (allowing pollution abatement 
only after judicial consideration of practicality and economic feasibility). 
 5. Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965) (lacking clear methods for 
determining violations of standards). 
 6. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs 
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 179–80 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (laying out 
the CWA’s legislative history in which congress members routinely referred to 
their purpose to create a “comprehensive” water pollution bill). 
 7. The EPA is charged with administering the CWA as a whole. 33 
U.S.C. § 1251(d). However, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has had primary 
jurisdiction to ensure the navigability of the nation’s waters since the Rivers 
and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1890. Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 907, §§ 
6,7,10, 26 Stat. 426, 453–54 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403, 407 
(2012)). Both since and prior to passage of the CWA, the Corps has controlled 
man-made deposition of dredge or fill material into navigable waters through 
permit programs. 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 407 (2012); see 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(4)–(5) 
(2012) (converting all 33 U.S.C. § 407 permits into NPDES permits); id. § 
1344(a)–(t) (2012) (preserving authority to administer issuance of permits for 
dredge or fill material to the Secretary of the Army acting through the Chief of 
Engineers). 
 8. CWA jurisdiction exists over “navigable waters,” which is 
ambiguously defined as “the waters of the United States, including territorial 
seas.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012). 
 9. See Margaret “Peggy” Strand & Lowell M. Rothschild, What Wetlands 
Are Regulated? Jurisdiction of the §404 Program, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS 10,372, 10,388 (2010) (“There have been cases and commentary that 
seem to distinguish between so-called isolated groundwater, i.e., groundwater 
with no hydrological connection to surface waters that would otherwise fall 
within CWA jurisdiction, and ‘tributary groundwater,’ i.e., groundwater with a 
hydrological connection to surface waters that would otherwise fall within 
CWA jurisdiction.”); see also Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 
1169, 1180 (D. Idaho 2001) (“[T]he CWA does not regulate 
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the CWA, the courts are in disagreement over whether the 
CWA’s jurisdiction can reach groundwater that is 
hydrologically connected to navigable waters.10 The EPA’s 
position generally is groundwater that has a direct hydrological 
connection to navigable waters of the United States is covered 
under the CWA, but only on a case-by-case basis.11 
                                                          
‘isolated/nontributary groundwater’ which has no affect on surface water.”) 
(citing Wash. Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 990 
(E.D. Wash. 1994)). 
 10. Compare Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 399 
F.3d 486, 514–15, 520 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that CWA jurisdiction exists over 
discharges of pollutants to groundwater that is hydrologically connected to 
navigable waters), and Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cnty. of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 
980, 996 (D. Haw. 2014) (same), and Ass’n Concerned Over Res. & Nature, 
Inc. v. Tenn. Aluminum Processors, Inc., No. 10-00084, 2011 WL 1357690, at 
*18–19 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 11, 2011) (same), and Hernandez v. Esso Standard 
Oil Co., 599 F. Supp. 2d 175, 181 (D.P.R. 2009) (same), and Nw. Envtl. Def. 
Ctr. v. Grabhorn, Inc., No. 08-548, 2009 WL 3672895, at *11 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 
2009) (same), and Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Larson, 641 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 
1138 (D. Idaho 2009) (same), and Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 
2d 1169, 1179 (D. Idaho 2001) (same), and Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer 
Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300, 1319–20 (S.D. Iowa 1997) (same), and Friends of 
Santa Fe Cnty. v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1357–58 (D.N.M. 
1995) (same), and Wash. Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 
983, 990 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (same), with Cape Fear River Watch, Inc. v. Duke 
Energy Progress, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 798, 810 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (concluding 
regulatory authority under CWA does not extend to groundwater regardless of 
whether groundwater is eventually or somehow hydrologically connected to 
navigable surface water), and Tri-Realty Co. v. Ursinus Coll., No. 11-5885, 
2013 WL 6164092, at *8 (E.D. Penn. Nov. 21, 2013) (holding that pollution to 
groundwater that connects to navigable water is nonpoint source pollution and 
not subject to NPDES permitting), and Patterson Farm, Inc. v. City of Britton, 
22 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1091 (D.S.D. 1998) (holding CWA regulatory authority 
does not extend to groundwater regardless of whether groundwater eventually 
reaches surface water), and United States v. ConAgra, No. 96-0134, 1997 WL 
33545777, at *7 (D. Idaho Dec. 31, 1997) (same), and Umatilla Waterquality 
Protective Ass’n, v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312, 1320 (D. Or. 
1997) (same), and Kelley ex rel. Mich. v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 1103, 
1107 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (same); see also infra Appendix A. 
 11. See Revised National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit 
Regulation and Effluent Limitations Guidelines for Concentrated Animal 
Feeding Operations in Response to Waterkeeper Decision, 73 Fed. Reg. 
70,418, 70,420 (Nov. 20, 2008) (“[EPA] believe[s] that requirements limiting 
the discharge of pollutants to surface water via groundwater that has a direct 
hydrologic connection to surface water should be addressed on a site-specific 
basis.”); see also National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit 
Regulation and Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for 
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66 Fed. Reg. 2960, 3015–17, 3061–
62 (proposed Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 412) 
(proposing to require NPDES permits for Concentrated Animal Feeding 
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While it is the EPA’s position that directly connected 
groundwater is covered under the CWA, it is unclear which 
theory of coverage the EPA relies on to assert jurisdiction.12 
The three theories that the EPA can potentially rely on are: the 
“point source” theory, the “tributary” groundwater theory, or 
the conduit theory. The “point source” theory offers protection 
to groundwater that discharges pollutants into navigable 
waters when that groundwater (1) receives the pollutants from 
a “point source”13 and (2) itself acts as a “discrete conveyance” 
of pollutants.14 Under this theory, the groundwater itself is 
                                                          
Operations discharging pollutants to groundwater on a case-by-case basis 
when there is a direct hydrological connection to surface waters); James W. 
Hayman, Regulating Point-Source Discharges to Groundwater Hydrologically 
Connected to Navigable Waters: An Unresolved Question of Environmental 
Protection Agency Authority Under the Clean Water Act, 5 BARRY L. REV. 95, 
113–14 (2005) (“[I]n publishing and codifying the final rule, EPA omitted all 
references to requiring NPDES permits for discharges to groundwater; the 
term ‘groundwater’ simply does not appear in the rule as promulgated . . . . 
Regarding the apparent ‘backing down’ from its asserted groundwater 
authority under the CWA in response to public pressure, EPA still claims 
groundwater authority and intends on exercising it, but only on a case-by-case 
basis. . . . Nothing in this rule should be construed to expand, diminish or 
otherwise affect CWA authority to control discharges to surface water via 
groundwater with a direct hydrologic connection. . . . EPA has far from 
abandoned its assertion of authority over hydrologically connected 
groundwater . . . . In fact, EPA has expressly stated its intention to still 
regulate discharges to hydrologically connected groundwater on a case-by-case 
basis.” (footnotes omitted)); Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Grabhorn, Inc., No. 08-548, 
2009 WL 3672895, at *9–11 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2009) (recognizing that the EPA 
and most courts have recognized two exceptions to a legislative history against 
the inclusion of groundwater under the CWA: one for situations in which there 
is a “direct hydrological connection between groundwaters and surface waters” 
and the second for underground segments of surface waters). 
 12. See discussion infra Part II.A.3. 
 13. The CWA defines a “point source” as: 
[A]ny discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not 
limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete 
fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding 
operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are 
or may be discharged. This term does not include agricultural 
stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture. 
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012). 
 14. Mary Christina Wood, Regulating Discharges into Groundwater: The 
Crucial Link in Pollution Control Under the Clean Water Act, 12 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 569, 575 (1988) (“A certain amount of groundwater travels in 
defined subterranean channels. As the following discussion suggests, these 
channels are very much akin to traditional ‘point sources’ and should be 
treated as such for the purposes of section 402. Under this interpretation, a 
discharge of pollutants into an underground channel that feeds surface water 
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considered a “point source.”15 The significant nexus theory 
treats groundwater in a way similar to how it would treat other 
surface waters—by upholding CWA jurisdiction over 
groundwater having a “significant nexus,”16 to navigable-in-fact 
waters.17 Finally, the conduit theory offers protection to 
groundwater that acts a conduit for pollutants travelling from a 
point source into navigable waters. Under this rationale, the 
momentary intermediation of groundwater is of no import 
because the fact remains that there is a discharge from a point 
source into navigable waters.18 
The EPA’s interpretation that directly connected 
groundwater is within the scope of the CWA’s jurisdiction has 
been accepted with varying degrees of success among the 
federal district and circuit courts.19 Some courts have 
                                                          
would be subject to the NPDES permit system. Characterizing underground 
channels as point sources is fully justified by the statutory language and 
legislative history of the CWA as well as relevant case law.”). Compare 
Raritan Baykeeper, Inc. v. NL Indus., Inc., No. 09-4117, 2013 WL 103880, at 
*15 (applying a motion to dismiss standard and deciding that the plaintiffs 
sufficiently pled that groundwater is a point source under the CWA because it 
is connected to a navigable water), with Tri-Realty Co. v. Ursinus Coll., No. 
11-5885, 2013 WL 6164092, at *8 (E.D. Penn. Nov. 21, 2013) (holding that 
pollution to groundwater that connects to navigable water is nonpoint source 
pollution and not subject to NPDES permitting). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 782 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 17. See Haw. Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 998 (“An aquifer with a 
substantial nexus with navigable-in-fact water may itself be protected under 
the Clean Water Act even if it is not necessarily a conduit for pollutants. But 
when it is established that groundwater is a conduit for pollutants . . . . 
[L]iability may attach to a discharge into that groundwater even if the 
groundwater is not itself protected under the Act.”). 
 18. Hawai`i Wildlife Fund explained that the argument was not that “the 
groundwater requires protection for its own independent ecological value,” but 
that the concern is, “the County should not be allowed to pollute the ocean 
through that groundwater.” Id. at 997. The same decision elaborated that the 
CWA, “creates a strict liability scheme that ‘categorically prohibits any 
discharge of a pollutant from a point source without a permit,’ irrespective of 
whether that discharge affects the receiving water.” Id. 
 19. Compare Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 599 F. Supp. 2d 175, 
179 (holding that groundwater is not categorically excluded from 
consideration as a “water of the United States,” but that a determination on 
groundwater’s status should be made by the EPA or Corps), with United 
States v. ConAgra, No. 96-0134, 1997 WL 33545777, at *6 (D. Idaho Dec. 31, 
1997) (declining to give the EPA any deference on the issue due to the EPA’s 
lack of a formal policy). 
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concluded that jurisdiction over such connected groundwater is 
warranted because (1) the CWA’s goal is to protect navigable 
waters, or (2) because the EPA is entitled to some level of 
deference on the issue.20 Other courts have decided that the 
CWA was simply not meant to cover groundwater, citing pieces 
of legislative history21 to support that position.22 A majority of 
courts have concluded that the CWA does cover connected 
groundwater, but the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the 
issue.23 This Note will explore the arguments that courts on 
both sides of the divide have accepted in concluding that 
groundwater hydrologically connected to navigable waters is or 
is not covered, the three potential theories for finding CWA 
jurisdiction over connected groundwater, what scientific factors 
courts have used in making case-specific determinations about 
whether hydrologically connected groundwater is covered, and 
alternative remedies that may be used to regulate or control 
pollution to groundwater under existing regulations. 
                                                          
 20. Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300, 1319–20 
(S.D. Iowa 1997) (deciding that because the CWA’s goal is to protect the 
quality of surface waters, the Act regulates any pollutants that enter such 
waters either directly or through groundwater); Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. 
Larson, 641 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1139 (D. Idaho 2009) (giving the EPA’s 
interpretation Skidmore deference); Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass’n v. 
Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312, 1319 n.2 (D. Or. 1997) 
(explaining that if the EPA issued a formal policy on groundwater 
hydrologically connected to surface waters, that interpretation would be 
accorded Chevron deference). 
 21. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 10, 666–69 (1972) (showing Congress’s 
rejection of Representative Aspin’s proposed amendment to the CWA, which 
would have extended CWA’s authority to even isolated groundwater). 
 22. Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass’n v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 
962 F. Supp. 1312, 1318–19 (D. Or. 1997) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp 
Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974)) (“The failure of a proposed amendment 
‘strongly militates against a judgment that Congress intended a result that it 
expressly declined to enact.’”); Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1327–30 
(5th Cir. 1977) (“We think, however, that the legislative history [including the 
Aspin Amendment] demonstrates conclusively that Congress believed it was 
not granting the Administrator any power to control disposals into 
groundwater.”); United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379, 1383–84 (S.D. 
Tex. 1975) (“This Court has neither the authority nor the inclination to act 
where the Congress has conferred no jurisdiction.”). 
 23. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Grabhorn, Inc., No. 08-548, 2009 WL 3672895, 
at *10 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2009). 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  CAN THE CWA’S JURISDICTION EXTEND TO GROUNDWATER 
HYDROLOGICALLY CONNECTED TO WATERS OF THE UNITED 
STATES? 
This background section examines the important statutory 
language, legislative history, agency interpretations, and case 
law relevant to the decision of whether the CWA can cover 
groundwater that is hydrologically connected to navigable 
waters. 
1.  The Statutory Language of the CWA Is Unclear On 
Whether the NPDES Permitting Program Was Meant to Cover 
Hydrologically Connected Groundwater. 
One of the CWA’s main provisions is its National Pollution 
Discharges Elimination System (NPDES) permitting program. 
Under the CWA’s NPDES program, the EPA has the authority 
to issue permits for facilities that have or plan to have “point 
sources” of pollution.24 The NPDES program does not have 
authority over nonpoint sources of pollution, so in order for 
CWA jurisdiction to be found, the source of pollution must fall 
within the scope of the “point source” definition.25 It is under 
the NPDES program that the EPA is asserting that directly 
connected groundwater should be covered, but only on a case-
by-case basis.26 The EPA’s position is that such connected 
groundwater would only be jurisdictional if the pollution 
contaminating the groundwater originated from a point 
source.27 In other words, if the pollution to groundwater 
originated from a nonpoint source it could not be turned into a 
point source by virtue of traveling through groundwater. 
Courts that determine the CWA’s NPDES program cannot 
extend jurisdiction over groundwater that is hydrologically 
connected to navigable waters rely on a few different statutory 
                                                          
 24. For a good summary and background of the provisions of the CWA, 
see CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30030, CLEAN WATER 
ACT: A SUMMARY OF THE LAW (2010). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit 
Regulation and Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for 
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66 Fed. Reg. 2960, 3015–17, 3061–
62 (proposed Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 412). 
 27. See id. 
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interpretation arguments to arrive at this conclusion. First, 
some courts state that if Congress intended the CWA to cover 
groundwater under the NPDES program, it would have written 
the CWA to say this explicitly.28 Next, these courts cite that 
Congress did explicitly include groundwater in other parts of 
the CWA, but not in the NPDES permitting scheme.29 The 
argument is that the NPDES permit program seems to exclude 
groundwater from coverage because it only makes reference to 
“navigable waters,” which are defined and referred to 
separately from groundwaters.30 
Courts that decide to uphold CWA jurisdiction over 
groundwater that is hydrologically connected to “waters of the 
United States” argue that in excluding groundwater from the 
NPDES permitting program Congress did not mean to exclude 
groundwater in all circumstances.31 The argument is that 
Congress meant to include all waters that have an adverse 
impact on the waters that are expressly covered by the NPDES 
program—navigable waters.32 Courts finding CWA jurisdiction 
over groundwater hydrologically connected to “waters of the 
United States” also look to the express purpose of the statute 
for guidance.33 These courts reason that because one purpose of 
the CWA is to protect the integrity of navigable waters, “any 
pollutant which enters such waters, whether directly or 
through groundwater, is subject to regulation by NPDES 
permit.”34 
2.  The Legislative History of the CWA Is Inconclusive of 
Congress’s Intent to Regulate Groundwater Hydrologically 
Connected to “Waters of the United States.” 
Most courts have considered the legislative history of the 
CWA before making a decision on the inclusion or exclusion of 
                                                          
 28. E.g., Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass’n v. Smith Frozen Foods, 
Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312, 1318 (D. Or. 1997). 
 29. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994)). 
 30. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)(1), 1362(12) (2012); see, e.g., 33 U.S.C § 
1314(a)(2) (referring to groundwaters separately from navigable waters). 
 31. E.g., Wash. Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 
989–90 (E.D. Wash. 1994); Sierra Club v. Colo. Ref. Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428, 
1433–34 (D. Colo. 1993). 
 32. See Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1180 (D. 
Idaho 2001). 
 33. See, e.g., id. 
 34. Id. (quoting Wash. Wilderness Coal., 870 F. Supp. at 990). 
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groundwater from the scope of the CWA’s statutory terms.35 
There are a few pieces of legislative history that could indicate 
that groundwater was not meant to be covered by the CWA’s 
NPDES permitting program. One of the most frequently cited 
pieces of legislative history on the subject is Representative 
Leslie Aspin’s proposed amendment to the CWA.36 This 
amendment suggested that the CWA’s jurisdiction be extended 
to include even isolated groundwater.37 Some courts rely on the 
rejection of this amendment as a basis for also declining to 
recognize CWA coverage for groundwater that is hydrologically 
connected to waters of the United States.38 This rejection of 
CWA coverage for connected groundwater may not be fair 
because the proposed amendment’s scope was much broader 
than just connected groundwater; in these cases, courts have 
refused to make the distinction between connected 
groundwater and isolated groundwater. 
The other piece of legislative history that is widely cited is 
the Senate Public Works Committee report, which states, 
“[b]ecause the jurisdiction regarding groundwaters is so 
complex and varied from State to State, the Committee did not 
adopt this recommendation [to add groundwater to the NPDES 
permitting program].”39 Those that argue the CWA should 
cover hydrologically connected groundwater say this piece of 
legislative history only indicates there was never an intent of 
                                                          
 35. See infra Appendix A. 
 36. See Anna Makowski, Beneath the Surface of the Clean Water Act: 
Exploring the Depths of the Act’s Jurisdictional Scope of Groundwater 
Pollution, 91 OR. L. REV. 495, 514 (2012) (“The Umatilla court and others see 
the rejection of the amendment as an indication that Congress did not intend 
to regulate groundwater under the CWA.”). Some of these courts that have 
considered the Aspin Amendment include: Umatilla Waterquality Protective 
Ass’n, v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312, 1318–19 (D. Or. 1997) 
(quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974)) (“The 
failure of a proposed amendment ‘strongly militates against a judgment that 
Congress intended a result that it expressly declined to enact.’”); Exxon Corp. 
v. Train, 554 F.2d. 1310, 1327–30 (5th Cir. 1977) (“We think, however, that 
the legislative history [including the Aspin Amendment] demonstrates 
conclusively that Congress believed it was not granting the Administrator any 
power to control disposals into groundwater.”); United States v. GAF Corp., 
389 F. Supp. 1379, 1383–84 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (“This Court has neither the 
authority nor the inclination to act where the Congress has conferred no 
jurisdiction.”). 
 37. See 118 CONG. REC. 10,666–69 (1972). 
 38. E.g., Umatilla, 962 F. Supp. at 1320. 
 39. See S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 73 (1971). 
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broad, comprehensive coverage of groundwater.40 Since one of 
the goals of the CWA is to protect navigable waters, certainly 
Congress did not intend to foreclose the possibility of regulating 
groundwater if it is connected to those navigable waters. Such 
an outcome would defeat the purpose of the CWA. 
There is also legislative history in a related statute that 
indicates it has been Congress’s understanding that 
hydrologically connected groundwater is covered by the CWA. 
Legislative history from the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) 
indicates that groundwater hydrologically connected to 
navigable waters is covered in the CWA. The legislative record 
from SDWA is less frequently cited by courts.41 A report from 
the House of Representatives explains that a primary reason 
for enacting SDWA was because, “it appears that the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act may not authorize any regulation 
of deep well injection of wastes which is not carried out in 
conjunction with a discharge into navigable waters.”42 The 
inference that can be taken out of this report is that at the time 
SDWA was enacted, Congress understood the CWA to cover 
groundwater that does discharge into navigable waters. 
Some courts have recognized that the legislative history 
does not support the inclusion of groundwater within the scope 
of the CWA. Some of these same opinions emphasize the goal of 
the CWA, which does support groundwater’s inclusion, and 
have therefore included groundwater despite what they believe 
about the legislative record.43 The District of Oregon, for 
example, changed its position on the CWA’s coverage of 
connected groundwater. In Umatilla Waterquality Protective 
Ass’n v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc.,44 the court analyzed the 
legislative history of the CWA and concluded that Congress 
explicitly excluded groundwater from coverage under the 
CWA.45 Later the same court decided in Grabhorn that the 
                                                          
 40. E.g., Umatilla, 962 F. Supp. 1318–19. 
 41. See infra Appendix A; see also Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 
1329 n.33 (5th Cir. 1977) (discussing this part of SDWA’s legislative history 
record and how it relates to the CWA). 
 42. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1185, at 6457 (1974) (emphasis added) (citing U.S. 
EPA, Opinion of Acting Deputy General Counsel, #590 (Dec. 13, 1973)). 
 43. See, e.g., Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Grabhorn, Inc., No. 08-548, 2009 WL 
3672895, at *10–11 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2009). 
 44. 962 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Or. 1997). 
 45. Id. 
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legislative history was against the regulation of groundwater, 
but that the EPA’s position and the goal of the CWA both 
override any legislative history that suggests the CWA cannot 
cover groundwater.46 
Grabhorn sidestepped Umatilla by recognizing that the 
EPA and most courts have recognized two exceptions:47 one for 
situations in which there is a “direct hydrological connection 
between groundwaters and surface waters” and the second for 
underground segments of surface waters.48 In the first 
exception, groundwater is not considered “waters of the United 
States,” but discharges from point sources to groundwater are 
regulated because such discharges are effectively discharges to 
the directly connected navigable waters.49 The second exception 
is not as controversial; the legal definition of underground 
segments of surface waters requires the underground water to 
retain the characteristics it displays above ground.50 
Regardless of what conclusions might be made about 
Congress’s intent with groundwater under the CWA’s 
legislative history, the history alone should not be dispositive. 
3.  The EPA’s Regulations on the Meaning of the Terms 
“Navigable” and “Waters of the United States” Offer Insight on 
How Far the CWA’s Jurisdiction Extends 
A core issue in the CWA is its use of the jurisdictional 
phrase “navigable waters.”51 Since “navigable waters” is 
                                                          
 46. See Grabhorn, 2009 WL 3672895 at *11. 
 47. See id. at *11. 
 48. Id.; Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that 
Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations, Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 
64,892 (Dec. 12, 1991). 
 49. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain 
to Standards on Indian Reservations, Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,892 
(codified as amended at 40 C.F.R pt. 131 (2014)) (“[T]he affected groundwaters 
are not considered ‘waters of the United States’ but discharges to them are 
regulated because such discharges are effectively discharges to the directly 
connected surface waters.”). 
 50. Underground segments of water are not considered groundwater and 
therefore are not discussed in this Note. Id. (“In such [underground] streams, 
the subterranean component must be sufficiently stream-like so as to possibly 
allow the passage of fish and other aquatic organisms from a surface segment 
of the stream into the underground segment.”). 
 51. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012); see SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 180–81 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (noting the jurisdictional term “navigable waters” was merely 
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ambiguously defined as “waters of the United States,” it is not 
clear what the term is meant to cover; from the time of the 
CWA’s creation it has been difficult for those enforcing the 
statute to interpret the meaning of this phrase. It is important 
to have a precise definition of “navigable waters” because a 
water body’s protection under the CWA hinges on its status of 
being included in this definition. While it might seem that the 
word “navigable” should be read to have its plain meaning—
those waters that are navigable-in-fact—the CWA gives 
“navigable” a different definition. Section 502(7) of the CWA 
defines navigable waters as “the waters of the United States, 
including the territorial seas.”52 
The term “waters of the United States” includes more than 
just navigable-in-fact waters.53 As defined in current 
                                                          
carried over from the earlier Rivers and Harbors Act and Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act). 
 52. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012). 
 53. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2012). The current regulations define “waters of 
the United States” as: 
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or 
may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including 
all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide; 
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands; 
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams 
(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, 
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural 
ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect 
interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters: 
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for 
recreational or other purposes; or 
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in 
interstate or foreign commerce; or 
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purpose by 
industries in interstate commerce; 
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the 
United States under the definition; 
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) of 
this section; 
(6) The territorial seas; 
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are 
themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (6) of 
this section. 
(8) Waters of the United States do not include prior converted 
cropland. Notwithstanding the determination of an area’s status as 
prior converted cropland by any other Federal agency, for the 
purposes of the Clean Water Act, the final authority regarding Clean 
Water Act jurisdiction remains with EPA. 
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regulations, the term “waters of the United States” includes not 
only actually navigable waters, but also tributaries of such 
waters, as well as adjacent wetlands.54 The EPA has recently 
proposed new regulations defining “waters of the United 
States,” which will replace the current regulations if adopted.55 
This proposed rule will change the definition of “waters of the 
United States” by adopting the significant nexus test,56 for 
making jurisdictional determinations about “other waters.”57 
The significant nexus test would evaluate the effect that the 
“other water” has on a navigable-in-fact water in order to 
determine whether jurisdiction exists over that water.58 
Significant to the question of whether hydrologically 
connected groundwater is covered by the CWA, in the EPA’s 
recently proposed “waters of the United States” rule, 
groundwater was listed as a water feature that does not fall 
within the definition of “waters of the United States.”59 While it 
seems scientifically defensible for the EPA to say that 
groundwater falls within the class of “other waters,” which 
after having passed the significant nexus analysis receive 
protection from the CWA, the EPA chose not to take this 
approach.60 While the EPA did not put groundwater in the list 
of “other waters,” it does not change the EPA’s longstanding 
                                                          
Waste treatment systems, including treatment ponds or lagoons 
designed to meet the requirements of CWA (other than cooling ponds 
as defined in 40 CFR 423.11(m) which also meet the criteria of this 
definition) are not waters of the United States. 
Id. 
 54. Id.; see also Cape Fear River Watch, Inc. v. Duke Energy Progress, 
Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 798, 805 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (“Indeed, the term is defined 
by . . . regulations to include not only actually navigable waters but also 
tributaries of such waters as well as adjacent wetlands. The regulations 
specify that ‘adjacent’ means ‘bordering, contiguous, or neighboring,’ and that 
wetlands are ‘adjacent’ even if separated from other waters by man-made 
dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like.” (footnotes 
omitted) (citations omitted)). 
 55. See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean 
Water Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 22,188 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014) (to be codified at 33 
C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 56. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 782 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 57. See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean 
Water Act, 79 Fed. Reg. at 22,188–92. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 22,193. 
 60. See discussion, infra Part II.A.4. 
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position that the CWA does cover, on a case-by-case basis, point 
source discharges to groundwater that is directly connected to 
navigable waters.61 
By adopting this approach, it seems the EPA is taking the 
position that groundwater itself cannot fall within the 
definition of “waters of the United States,” but it leaves open 
the possibility that groundwater is regulated either as a 
“conduit” for a “point source” or as a “point source” itself.62 In 
the rule, the EPA stated, “the magnitude and transit time of 
groundwater flow from an ‘other water’ to downstream waters 
depend on several factors, including the intervening distance 
and the properties of the rock or unconsolidated sediments 
between the water bodies (i.e., the hydraulic conductivity of the 
material).”63 The EPA’s language here indicates that a flow 
requirement for groundwater might also exist in order to 
receive CWA protection.64 
4.  Background in CWA Case Law: The Riverside Bayview and 
Rapanos Decisions Can Also Be Helpful for Determining 
Whether CWA Jurisdiction Can Extend to Groundwater. 
The meaning of the term “navigable” has been the focus of 
debate in several Supreme Court decisions. In the 1985 
Riverside Bayview decision,65 the Supreme Court recognized 
that by defining “navigable waters” as “the waters of the 
United States,” the term “navigable” as used in the Act is of 
“limited import.”66 The Court concluded that in adopting the 
definition of “navigable waters,” Congress “evidently intended 
to repudiate limits that had been placed on federal regulation 
. . . and to exercise its powers under the Commerce Clause to 
regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed 
‘navigable’ under the classical understanding of that term.”67 In 
                                                          
 61. See Hayman, supra note 11, at 114 (“EPA stated that it interprets the 
CWA to apply to point-source discharges of pollutants via hydrologically 
connected groundwater . . . .”). 
 62. See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean 
Water Act, 79 Fed. Reg. at 22,193. 
 63. See id. at 22,248 (emphasis added). 
 64. A situation in which relatively stagnant groundwater could 
contaminate navigable waters through the diffusion of a large amount of 
pollution may not have been considered by the EPA. 
 65. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985). 
 66. Id. at 133. 
 67. Id. 
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Riverside Bayview, the jurisdictional status of wetlands that 
“actually abutted” navigable-in-fact waters was at issue.68 The 
Supreme Court noted that it was hard to distinguish when the 
wetland ended and the navigable water began, and concluded 
that the definition of “waters of the United States” included 
those wetlands that actually abut navigable waters.69 
Following the Riverside Bayview decision, the enforcing 
agencies adopted increasingly broad interpretations of what the 
term “waters of the United States” included.70 
The Supreme Court narrowed the Corps’ regulatory power 
in the 2001 Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. 
Army Corps of Engineers Supreme Court decision (SWANCC).71 
The Corps’ Migratory Bird Rule was invalidated as a result of 
the SWANCC decision.72 Before SWANCC, the Corps could 
claim that its authority under CWA § 404(a) extended to all 
waters that were or would be used by internationally protected 
migratory birds as a habitat.73 In SWANCC, the Supreme 
Court “rejected the expansive jurisdiction over wetlands that 
the Corps had exercised for the prior twenty-five years, [and] 
recommend[ed] that the rules be rewritten.”74 The SWANCC 
decision also was the first to use the term “significant nexus” in 
describing a required connection between navigable-in-fact 
waters and a body of water that the EPA asserted was under 
its jurisdiction.75 The term significant nexus became important 
in the Rapanos decision, where it was used as the foundation of 
                                                          
 68. Id. at 135. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Cape Fear River Watch, Inc. v. Duke Energy Progress, Inc., 25 F. 
Supp. 3d 798, 806 (E.D.N.C. 2014). 
 71. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs 
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001) (majority opinion). 
 72. Id. (“We conclude that the ‘Migratory Bird Rule’ is not fairly 
supported by the CWA.”). 
 73. Id. (“In 1986, the Corps attempted to clarify its jurisdiction, stating, in 
what has been dubbed the ‘Migratory Bird Rule,’ that § 404(a) extends to 
intrastate waters that, inter alia, provide habitat for migratory birds.”). 
 74. Gregory H. Morrison, Comment, A Nexus of Confusion: Why the 
Agencies Responsible for Clean Water Act Enforcement Should Promulgate a 
New Set of Rules Governing the Act’s Jurisdiction, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 398, 
406 (2011). 
 75. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167 (“It was the significant nexus between the 
wetlands and ‘navigable waters’ that informed our reading of the CWA in 
Riverside Bayview Homes.”). 
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Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion.76 Justice Kennedy’s 
significant nexus test in Rapanos has become a standard test in 
the lower courts along with Scalia’s plurality test.77 
The confusion over the Corps’ jurisdiction under the CWA 
was manifested in the 2006 Supreme Court Rapanos 
opinions.78 Rapanos was a plurality decision that included five 
different opinions.79 None of these opinions questioned the 
jurisdiction of the government over wetlands adjacent to 
navigable-in-fact water bodies.80 Instead, Rapanos questioned 
the authority over all other wetlands; wetlands that do not 
maintain either a “significant nexus” or continuous surface 
connection to a traditional navigable water body, or are so-
called “geographically isolated,” are outside of CWA jurisdiction 
due to the Rapanos decision.81 The reason for the exclusion of 
isolated wetlands from CWA jurisdiction is because they do not 
impact navigable waters.82 Since the goal of the CWA is to 
protect the Nation’s waters, and one goal is specifically to limit 
discharges to navigable waters, those waters that do not affect 
“waters of the United States” are outside the goal of the CWA. 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Rapanos contained 
criticism for both the plurality and dissenting opinions.83 While 
Kennedy agreed with the plurality opinion in that Congress 
intended the Corps to regulate waters that are not contained in 
the traditional definition of “navigable waters,” Kennedy’s 
concurrence did not support all of the limitations the plurality 
placed on the Corps’ jurisdiction.84 Kennedy’s concurrence also 
did not support the plurality’s interpretation of “navigable 
waters” to only include relatively permanent water bodies, or 
that the CWA only intended to protect waters that have a 
                                                          
 76. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 782 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 77. ROBERT MELTZ & CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 
33263, THE WETLANDS COVERAGE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT (CWA): RAPANOS 
AND BEYOND 7–8 (2014). 
 78. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
 79. Id. at 715 (plurality); id. at 757 (Roberts, J., concurring); id. at 759 
(Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 811 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 80. Id. at 792 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 81. See id. at 755 (plurality opinion). 
 82. Id. at 776–77 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 83. Id. at 776, 778. 
 84. Id. at 768–78. 
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continuous surface connection to those navigable waters.85 On 
the other hand, Justice Kennedy opposed the dissent’s 
incredibly broad deference to the Corps’ authority, and noted 
their lack of emphasis on the key term “navigable” from the 
CWA.86 
Instead, Kennedy introduced the significant nexus test, 
originating from the 2001 SWANCC decision, and argued that 
the test is the proper standard for determining federal 
jurisdiction over wetlands.87 He also argued that this test 
would have to be carried out on a case-by-case basis, at least 
until the enforcing agencies promulgate new regulations.88 
Kennedy asserted that wetlands are “waters of the United 
States” and therefore protected under the CWA when, “the 
wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly 
situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more 
readily understood as ‘navigable.’”89 The test from Rapanos 
that is the most widely accepted by the lower courts is this 
significant nexus test.90 
Justice Scalia devised his own two-part test in order to 
determine a wetland’s jurisdictional status. Scalia’s test 
required that in order for a wetland to be jurisdictional, it must 
(1) be adjacent to a water of the United States, and (2) have a 
continuous surface connection to that adjacent water.91 While it 
is generally thought that Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus 
test is the more inclusive one, each test includes at least one 
type of water feature or discharge that the other does not. For 
example, the significant nexus test is the only test that can 
support finding CWA jurisdiction over groundwater 
hydrologically connected to “waters of the United States.”92 The 
plurality test would not support finding jurisdiction over 
groundwater because it requires a surface connection.93 The 
plurality test may include very small, but continuous 
                                                          
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 778–80. 
 87. Id. at 779–80. 
 88. Id. at 782. 
 89. Id. at 780. 
 90. MELTZ & COPELAND, supra note 77. 
 91. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 717 (plurality opinion). 
 92. Id. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 93. Id. at 742 (plurality opinion). 
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discharges into non-navigable tributaries of “waters of the 
United States,” even if they did not significantly impact the 
“waters of the United States,” because a continuous surface 
connection would exist.94 It is doubtful that the significant 
nexus test would cover such a circumstance because the 
significant nexus test focuses more on the nature of the impact 
rather than the nature of the connection. In other words, the 
significant nexus test is more goal-oriented with respect to the 
CWA than the plurality test. 
Since the only Rapanos test that would support CWA 
jurisdiction over groundwater is Kennedy’s significant nexus 
test, it is important to know just how widely lower courts have 
accepted it. Not a single federal circuit court decision has 
adopted the plurality test without also adopting the significant 
nexus test.95 So, not a single circuit court has declined to apply 
the significant nexus test. The wide acceptance of the 
significant nexus test means that there are fewer barriers to 
recognition of CWA jurisdiction over groundwater. 
B.  WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HYDROLOGICALLY 
CONNECTED GROUNDWATER AND SURFACE WATER? 
It is important to have a basic understanding of the 
hydrology between groundwater and surface water to fully 
understand the issues of whether groundwater can be 
considered a point source, whether groundwater is ever 
connected enough to have a significant nexus to surface waters, 
or even whether there is a scientific basis for distinguishing 
                                                          
 94. See id. at 776–77 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[B]y saying the Act 
covers wetlands (however remote) possessing a surface-water connection with 
a continuously flowing stream (however small), the plurality’s reading would 
permit applications of the statute as far from traditional federal authority as 
are the waters it deems beyond the statute’s reach.”); United States v. 
Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[I]n cases where there is a small 
surface water connection to a stream or brook, the plurality’s jurisdictional 
test would be satisfied, but Justice Kennedy’s balancing of interests might 
militate against finding a significant nexus.”). 
 95. See United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 176 (3d Cir. 2011); 
Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 278, 288 (4th Cir. 
2011); United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 210 (6th Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lucas, 516 
F.3d 316, 327 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Robinson, 521 F.3d 1319, 1327 
(11th Cir. 2008); N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 
999–1000 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 
2006); United States v. Gerke, 464 F.3d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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groundwater and surface water in the CWA.96 The term “point 
source” is defined in the CWA as “any discernible, confined and 
discrete conveyance.”97 Under the EPA’s interpretation, the 
strength of a hydrological connection between groundwater and 
a navigable water is important in determining whether 
groundwater can fall within the scope of the CWA because the 
EPA requires a “direct connection.”98 
The strength of a connection varies widely based on a 
number of factors. Groundwater flows with gravity, and is 
influenced by the natural slopes in land.99 It also often serves 
as the base flow of rivers, sometimes making it 
indistinguishable from surface waters, and it is incredibly 
important to the integrity of surface waters.100 Groundwater is 
generally suspended in the soil and is constantly moving or 
“flowing,” but it does so at drastically different rates, depending 
on the type of soil that is present.101 The distance between 
groundwater and navigable waters and the time it takes that 
groundwater to travel (highly dependent on soil type and 
topography) could hugely impact whether that groundwater 
might be considered a “point source” of pollution to “waters of 
the United States” or whether that groundwater maintains a 
“significant nexus” to “waters of the United States.” 
                                                          
 96. For a very helpful background on hydrology with explanatory 
diagrams, see THOMAS C. WINTER ET AL., U. S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GROUND 
WATER AND SURFACE WATER: A SINGLE RESOURCE, NATURAL PROCESSES OF 
GROUND-WATER AND SURFACE-WATER INTERACTION (1998). Scientific factors 
and hydrology are less relevant to the conduit theory because under the 
conduit theory, the groundwater acting as a conduit need not also be “confined 
and discrete.” The key inquiry is whether there are pollutants actually ending 
up in navigable waters. Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cnty. of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 
980, 994–96 (D. Haw. 2014). 
 97. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012) (“[I]ncluding but not limited to any pipe, 
ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, 
concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from 
which pollutants are or may be discharged.”). 
 98. See sources cited supra note 11; see also Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. 
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 399 F.3d 486, 514–15 & n.26 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(reviewing EPA’s interpretation that direct discharges to navigable water via 
hydrologically connected groundwater can be covered under the CWA on a 
case-by-case basis depending on the strength of site-specific factors). 
 99. Richard M. Iverson & Mark E. Reid, Gravity-Driven Groundwater 
Flow and Slope Failure Potential, 28 WATER RESOURCES RES. 925, 925 (1992). 
 100. See generally WINTER ET AL., supra note 96, at 6–17. 
 101. Id. Clay is one of the most movement-restrictive types of soil. Id. at 7, 
12–13. 
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Factors that courts have looked at to make a case-specific 
determination of whether groundwater is a point source include 
distance to navigable waters, time it takes groundwater to 
travel, depth of the groundwater, flow (presumably direction 
and rate), climate, geology, soil type, topography, elevation, and 
slope.102 All of the court opinions that go into a more scientific 
analysis of the groundwater at issue identify a different set of 
factors.103 One decision that adopted the conduit theory104—
Hawai`i Wildlife Fund—argues, however, that “[n]either logic 
nor case law supports distinguishing between ‘shallow’ and 
‘deep’ groundwater. The key factor is not the depth [or 
distance] of the groundwater, but the existence of a pollutant 
that eventually reaches [a navigable water].”105 Because the 
conduit theory focuses on the end result, that pollutants from a 
point source end up in navigable water, and not the intervening 
factors, scientific criteria are of more limited import under this 
theory. Though Hawai`i Wildlife Fund analyzed a tracer-dye 
study, which reported how quickly the pollutants were reaching 
the navigable waters,106 this study was used to show that the 
pollutants were, in fact, reaching navigable waters.107 
With no specific set of scientific criteria identified for 
making decisions on whether groundwater has a strong enough 
connection to “waters of the United States,” each case that does 
                                                          
 102. Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 399 F.3d 486, 
515 (2d Cir. 2005) (identifying topography, climate, distance to surface waters, 
and soil type as factors contributing to the strength of groundwater 
connections to surface water); Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Larson, 641 F. 
Supp. 2d 1120, 1138 (D. Idaho 2009) (assessing the travel time, distance, 
geology, flow, and slope of the groundwater at issue). 
 103. See cases cited supra note 102. 
 104. Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cnty. of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980, 999 (D. Haw. 
2014) (“A point source is specifically defined in the Clean Water Act as a 
‘confined and discrete conveyance.’ While any conduit that is a ‘confined and 
discrete conveyance’ is a point source, that does not mean that all conduits 
must be ‘confined and discrete conveyances.’ An injection well itself is a point 
source, and the groundwater acting as a conduit need not also be ‘confined and 
discrete.’ Courts have adopted ‘the indirect discharge rationale and the point 
source rationale in the alternative.’” (citation omitted)). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 984 (“Dye from wells 1 and 2 
did not emerge at the seeps, but the dye introduced into wells 3 and 4 was 
detected eighty-four days after being placed in the wells.”). 
 107. Id. (“As a result of that finding, the report also concluded that ‘64% of 
the treated wastewater injected into [the] wells currently discharges from the 
submarine spring areas’ and into the ocean.”). 
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define these criteria or offers reasoning on how to make a case-
specific determination of groundwater coverage is important. 
These few cases that identify criteria offer helpful guidelines 
for determining whether groundwater is connected to navigable 
water in a way that provides CWA coverage under either the 
theory that groundwater can be treated as a point source, or 
the theory that the significant nexus test from Rapanos can be 
used to assert jurisdiction over groundwater that significantly 
affects navigable water.108 
C.  AN OVERVIEW OF DECISIONS ON HYDROLOGICALLY 
CONNECTED GROUNDWATER 
Decisions on the CWA’s coverage of groundwater have had 
a variety of outcomes. In order to provide a detailed analysis of 
these decisions, Appendix A illustrates how courts have come 
down on both the issues of (1) whether groundwater that is 
hydrologically connected to navigable waters can ever be 
covered under the CWA, and (2) if yes, then whether the 
groundwater in the specific case is jurisdictional based on its 
connection to navigable waters. Appendix A also provides the 
reasoning each decision offered for arriving at its conclusions 
and the factual circumstances of the case. 
Though the table in Appendix A analyzes a total of thirty-
three decisions, only six of those decisions can be said to have 
definitively decided against any CWA jurisdiction over 
groundwater.109 Twenty decisions have definitively said that 
                                                          
 108. See id. at 998 (“An aquifer with a substantial nexus with navigable-in-
fact water may itself be protected under the Clean Water Act even if it is not 
necessarily a conduit for pollutants. But when it is established that 
groundwater is a conduit for pollutants, liability may attach to a discharge 
into that groundwater even if the groundwater is not itself protected under 
the Act.”); see also Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 782 (2006) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 109. Those decisions are: Cape Fear River Watch, Inc. v. Duke Energy 
Progress, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 798, 810 (E.D.N.C. 2014); Tri-Realty Co. v. 
Ursinus Coll., No. 11-5885, 2013 WL 6164092, at *8 (E.D. Penn. Nov. 21, 
2013); Patterson Farm, Inc. v. City of Britton, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1091 
(D.S.D. 1998); United States v. ConAgra, No. 96-0134, 1997 WL 33545777, at 
*7 (D. Idaho Dec. 31, 1997); Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass’n, v. Smith 
Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F.Supp. 1312, 1320 (D. Or. 1997); Kelley ex rel. Mich. 
v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 1103, 1107 (W.D. Mich. 1985). Two of these 
decisions had subsequent cases in the same district that decided the issue the 
opposite way. See Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Larson, 641 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 
1138 (D. Idaho 2009); Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Grabhorn, Inc., No. 08-548, 2009 
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the CWA does cover groundwater that is hydrologically 
connected to “waters of the United States.”110 Furthermore, 
many of those decisions that have definitively decided that 
groundwater is not covered rely on cases that do not also 
conclude that groundwater hydrologically connected to 
navigable waters cannot be under the jurisdiction of the CWA. 
Some of those cases finding CWA jurisdiction over connected 
groundwater have also held that the groundwater need not 
discharge into navigable-in-fact waters; discharges into “waters 
of the United States” are sufficient to confer jurisdiction.111 The 
decisions upholding CWA jurisdiction also differ on whether 
                                                          
WL 3672895, at *11 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2009); Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 
F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1180 (D. Idaho 2001). 
 110. Those decisions are: Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, 399 F.3d 486, 514–15 (2d Cir. 2005); Quivira Mining Co. v. U.S. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, 765 F.2d 126, 130 (10th Cir. 1985); Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cnty. 
of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980, 996 (D. Haw. 2014); Raritan Baykeeper, Inc. v. 
NL Indus., Inc., No. 09-4117, 2013 WL 103880, at *15 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2013); 
Ass’n Concerned Over Res. & Nature, Inc. v. Tenn. Aluminum Processors, Inc., 
No. 10-00084, 2011 WL 1357690, at *18–19 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 11, 2011); 
Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 599 F. Supp. 2d 175, 181 (D.P.R. 2009); 
Greater Yellowstone Coal v. Larson, 641 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1138 (D. Idaho 
2009); Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Grabhorn, Inc., No. 08-548, 2009 WL 3672895, 
at *11 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2009); Coldani v. Hamm, No. 07-660, 2007 WL 2345016, 
at *7–8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2007); N. Cal. River Watch v. Mercer Fraser Co., 
No. 04-4620, 2005 WL 2122052, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2005); N. Cal. 
River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, No. 01-04686, 2004 WL 201502, at *35 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2004); Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., No. 01-
2163, 2002 WL 33932715, at *13 (D. Colo. Nov. 15, 2002); Idaho Rural Council 
v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1180 (D. Idaho 2001); Mut. Life Ins. Co. of 
N.Y. v. Mobil Corp., No. 96-1781, 1998 WL 160820, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 
1998); Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300, 1319–20 
(S.D. Iowa 1997); Friends of Santa Fe Cnty. v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. 
Supp. 1333, 1357–58 (D.N.M. 1995); Wash. Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining 
Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 990 (E.D. Wash. 1994); Sierra Club v. Colo. Ref. Co., 
838 F. Supp. 1428, 1432–34 (D. Colo. 1993); New York v. United States, 620 F. 
Supp. 374, 381 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Kelley v. United States, No. 79-10199, 1980 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17772, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 1980). 
 111. See Coldani v. Hamm, No. 07-660, 2007 WL 2345016, at *7–8 (E.D. 
Cal. Aug. 16, 2007) (“In the instant case, Coldani alleges that animal waste 
from Lima Ranch’s dairy has infiltrated and polluted groundwater that 
discharges into the White Slough, which in turn empties into navigable 
waters, the San Joaquin River Delta System. In short, Coldani alleges that 
Lima Ranch has polluted groundwater that is hydrologically connected to 
navigable waters. Such pleading is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.” 
(citation omitted)); Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1180 
(D. Idaho 2001) (“[T]he Court finds that the CWA extends federal jurisdiction 
over groundwater that is hydrologically connected to surface waters that are 
themselves waters of the United States.”). 
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the connected groundwater is effectively considered (1) a “water 
of the United States,” after a significant nexus analysis, (2) a 
conduit for a point source, or (3) a point source itself.112 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD UPHOLD CWA JURISDICTION 
OVER GROUNDWATER THAT IS HYDROLOGICALLY CONNECTED TO 
NAVIGABLE WATERS 
This section offers a critique of the acceptance and 
rejection of a variety of arguments by courts when deciding the 
issue of whether the CWA’s jurisdiction covers groundwater. 
This section analyzes the merits of the legislative history and 
statutory interpretation arguments that are made in support of 
and against the inclusion of groundwater in the CWA’s 
jurisdiction, whether the EPA should get deference on its 
position, the treatment of groundwater as a point source, and 
the treatment of groundwater under the other two theories for 
finding CWA jurisdiction. 
1.  The Legislative History of the CWA Provides No Real 
Guide on How Courts Should Treat Groundwater that Is 
Hydrologically Connected. 
All of the courts that decline to uphold CWA coverage over 
hydrologically connected groundwater cite the legislative 
history of the CWA as being unfavorable to the regulation of 
groundwater.113 On the issue of hydrologically connected 
groundwater, rather than isolated groundwater, legislative 
history arguments under the CWA are not persuasive. Those 
courts that determine coverage based on legislative history 
unfavorable to the regulation of groundwater say that it was 
Congress’s desire to exclude groundwater from coverage by 
declining to enact the Aspin Amendment.114 Congress had the 
opportunity to include groundwater in the regulatory scheme, 
contemplated it, and rejected it. The decision to reject the 
Aspin Amendment, however, only speaks to Congress’s intent 
to avoid enacting expansive groundwater regulations. 
                                                          
 112. See infra Appendix A. 
 113. See infra Appendix A. 
 114. See 118 CONG. REC. 10,666–69 (1972) (rejecting the Aspin 
Amendment). 
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Congress’s decision to reject the Aspin Amendment represents 
nothing more than a decision to not include all groundwater as 
per se jurisdictional, falling within the definition of “waters of 
the United States.” 
Though this evidence unfavorable to regulation exists, 
there are favorable legislative records from a related statute. 
The legislative history of SDWA indicates there was an 
understanding in Congress at the time SDWA was enacted that 
groundwater can be regulated under the CWA so long as it 
discharges into navigable waters.115 Even if a court concluded 
that the legislative history of the CWA is slanted against 
coverage of groundwater hydrologically connected to navigable 
waters, it is still inconclusive at best. In the face of an 
inconclusive legislative record, the explicit purpose of the CWA 
and the EPA’s interpretation of the CWA’s coverage of 
connected groundwater should control how the issue is treated. 
2.  The Explicit Purpose of the CWA Is to Protect “Waters of 
the United States,” so Groundwater Connected to Those Waters 
Should Be Protected in Order to Achieve that Purpose. 
The explicit language of the CWA proscribing its intent 
and goals is much more controlling than any sort of inference 
that is attempted from the CWA’s legislative history. The 
strong language in the case, Northern California River Watch 
v. Mercer Fraser Co., is quite convincing. The court pronounced, 
it would hardly make sense for the CWA to encompass a polluter 
who discharges pollutants via a pipe running from the factory 
directly to the riverbank, but not a polluter who dumps the same 
pollutants into a man-made settling basin some distance short of the 
river and then allows the pollutants to seep into the river via the 
groundwater.116 
As illustrated by this case, Congress likely did not intend to 
create a loophole in the CWA that allows polluters to escape 
responsibility for the pollution they cause to the very waters 
that the Act tries to protect. 
Another theory advanced by those ultimately excluding 
groundwater from CWA coverage is the popular statutory 
                                                          
 115. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1185, at 6457 (1974) (“[I]t appears that the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act may not authorize any regulation of deep well 
injection of wastes which is not carried out in conjunction with a discharge 
into navigable waters.”). 
 116. N. Cal. River Watch v. Mercer Fraser Co., No. 04-4620, 2005 WL 
2122052, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2005). 
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interpretation argument maintaining that because 
groundwater is not included in the CWA’s definition of 
“navigable waters,” or in the EPA’s regulatory definition of 
“waters of the United States,” the CWA does not regulate 
groundwater.117 This argument is unpersuasive because the 
failure to list groundwater in the definition of “waters of the 
United States” does not necessarily preclude it from the scope 
of the CWA as a “water of the United States,” and certainly 
does not preclude regulating discharges to groundwater that 
end up in “waters of the United States.” The argument would 
go that the regulation of hydrologically connected groundwater 
argument is in line with the CWA’s purpose, and actually the 
key link holding this entire system together. Without 
regulation of groundwater, which is often indistinguishable 
from surface water, how could the CWA effectively achieve its 
purpose? 
Alternatively, if a court were unwilling to extend “waters of 
the United States” status to connected groundwater, then the 
argument would be that such groundwater is still jurisdictional 
by virtue of it discharging into navigable waters, not because it 
is jurisdictional in its own right. Under such an approach, the 
argument would be the CWA’s purpose still allows for 
jurisdiction over connected groundwater under two different 
theories: the point source theory and the conduit theory. So, the 
hydrologically connected groundwater could still be treated as a 
point source, or a conduit for a point source. Under the point 
source theory, there is a burden to show that the groundwater 
was “confined and discrete,” but under the conduit theory, 
there is no such burden.118 Either theory could provide 
protection for connected groundwater without having to 
address any legislative history or regulatory concerns about the 
exclusion of groundwater from the jurisdictional definitions 
“navigable” and “waters of the United States.” 
3.  While the EPA’s Interpretation that CWA Jurisdiction 
Should Extend to Cover Directly Connected Groundwater, It Is 
                                                          
 117. See, e.g., Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Grabhorn, Inc., No. 08-548, 2009 WL 
3672895, at *10 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2009). 
 118. See Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cnty. of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980, 994–96 
(D. Haw. 2014) (explaining that groundwater acting as a conduit need not be 
“confined and discrete”). 
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Not Clear Which Theory the EPA Applies to Assert 
Jurisdiction. 
Because the EPA’s interpretation of the CWA’s coverage of 
hydrologically connected groundwater has been promulgated in 
the preamble to a final rule119 and was made in 2008 after the 
guidance in both the SWANCC and Rapanos decisions, the 
EPA’s interpretation should be entitled to some level of 
deference.120 Because both the CWA and its legislative history 
are ambiguous on the subject of hydrologically connected 
groundwater and the EPA’s interpretation is both reasonable 
and consistent with the purpose of the CWA, substantial 
deference should be applied to the EPA’s interpretation. 
A court may decide, however, that the goal of the CWA is 
enough to conclude that it was Congress’s intent to include 
connected groundwater because holding otherwise would create 
a loophole that would defeat the purpose of the CWA. Even if a 
court did not conclude that the purpose of the CWA dictated 
the inclusion of connected groundwater, that court would be 
                                                          
 119. See Revised National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit 
Regulation and Effluent Limitations Guidelines for Concentrated Animal 
Feeding Operations in Response to Waterkeeper Decision, 73 Fed. Reg. 
70,418, 70,420 (Nov. 20, 2008) (“[EPA] believe[s] that requirements limiting 
the discharge of pollutants to surface water via groundwater that has a direct 
hydrologic connection to surface water should be addressed on a site-specific 
basis.”). 
 120. See Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586–87 (2000) (“In 
Chevron, we held that a court must give effect to an agency’s regulation 
containing a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Here, 
however, we confront an interpretation contained in an opinion letter, not one 
arrived at after, for example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. Interpretations such as those in opinion letters—like 
interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and 
enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant 
Chevron-style deference.”); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 
474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985) (“An agency’s construction of a statute it is charged 
with enforcing is entitled to deference if it is reasonable and not in conflict 
with the expressed intent of Congress.”); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984) (holding that if the relevant 
statute is silent or ambiguous on the question at issue, the reviewing court 
may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a 
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of the agency);  Bowles v. 
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413–14 (1945) (holding that when an 
agency interprets its own regulation, the Court defers to it unless that 
interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation); see 
also Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1391–96 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(“This preamble material has never been subjected to notice-and-comment 
procedures and has not been promulgated as an official regulation.”). 
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forced to give the EPA at least some degree of deference on its 
interpretation.121 In order to find that groundwater is not 
regulated under the CWA at all, a court will have to find that 
the EPA’s interpretation, despite being in line with most court’s 
opinions on the issue and the express goals of the CWA, is an 
impermissible construction of the statute. Here, the fact that 
the EPA’s interpretation avoids the defeat of the purpose of the 
CWA may necessitate that a court rules in its favor. 
Even though the EPA’s interpretation that groundwater 
connected to navigable waters can be covered by the CWA is 
consistent with the goal of the CWA, the EPA may still have 
problems with its interpretation. Where the EPA may run into 
some trouble is that its interpretation is unclear on which 
theory it uses to arrive at the conclusion that connected 
groundwater is within the scope of the CWA. Because the EPA 
failed to include groundwater in the definition of “other waters” 
in its proposed rule on the definition of the term “waters of the 
United States,” it seems the EPA is expressly avoiding ever 
classifying groundwater as a “water of the United States.” 
Though this much may be ascertained about the EPA’s 
position, there are still two theories that the EPA will have to 
choose from. Based on the EPA’s language that groundwater 
must be “directly” connected to navigable waters, it seems that 
the EPA’s position is most in-line with the point source 
theory.122 Because the point source theory focuses on the 
nature of the connection, rather than the end result, the EPA’s 
position requiring a “direct connection” looks like the EPA is 
requiring the groundwater to be a “point source” in order to fall 
within the scope of the CWA’s jurisdiction, even though it does 
not explicitly say it. 
                                                          
 121. See sources cited supra note 120. 
 122. See Revised National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit 
Regulation and Effluent Limitations Guidelines for Concentrated Animal 
Feeding Operations in Response to Waterkeeper Decision, 73 Fed. Reg. 
70,418, 70,420 (Nov. 20, 2008) (“[EPA] believe[s] that requirements limiting 
the discharge of pollutants to surface water via groundwater that has a direct 
hydrologic connection to surface water should be addressed on a site-specific 
basis.”). 
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4.  The EPA Could Assert Jurisdiction over Connected 
Groundwater in the Same Manner as It Does for Non-
Navigable Surface Waters: With the Significant Nexus Test. 
In making determinations about whether groundwater can 
fall under the scope of the CWA’s coverage, courts could apply 
the significant nexus test on a case-by-case basis to analyze the 
strength of the hydrologic connection between the groundwater 
and navigable waters.123 Much like for surface water features, 
the test for groundwater could be whether the groundwater 
significantly affects the navigable waters. Such an approach 
would not conflict with the legislative history of the CWA or its 
statutory language because it would not impose direct federal 
control over all groundwater. Instead, only that groundwater 
found to have a sufficiently strong connection to the navigable 
waters would fall within the jurisdictional reach of the CWA. 
This approach would be very scientifically defensible.124 Often 
it is impossible to distinguish between surface water and 
groundwater, for example when groundwater serves as the 
base flow for a river. The factors that a few courts have already 
identified for making scientific determinations about 
connectivity could serve as guidelines for courts in the future 
for applying the significant nexus test to groundwater. Factors 
already identified include distance to navigable waters, time it 
takes groundwater to travel, depth of the groundwater, flow 
(presumably direction and rate), diffusion, climate, geology, soil 
type, topography, elevation, and slope.125 
Though this set of scientific criteria offers guiding 
principles for future courts, none of the factors would itself be 
dispositive of CWA coverage under the significant nexus test. 
                                                          
 123. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 780 (2006) (Kennedy, J. 
concurring) (explaining that water features fall under CWA jurisdiction if 
they, “significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of 
other covered waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’”). 
 124. Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cnty. of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980, 995 (D. Haw. 
2014) (“There is nothing inherent about groundwater conveyances and surface 
water conveyances that requires distinguishing between these conduits under 
the Clean Water Act.”). 
 125. Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 399 F.3d 486, 
515 (2d Cir. 2005) (identifying topography, climate, distance to surface waters, 
and soil type as factors that help assess the strength of groundwater to surface 
water connections); Haw. Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 999–1000 
(assessing the diffusion rate of the groundwater at issue); Greater Yellowstone 
Coal. v. Larson, 641 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1138 (D. Idaho 2009) (assessing the 
travel time, distance, geology, flow, and slope of the groundwater at issue). 
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For example, no strict distance or depth requirement should be 
formed. Since Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test is very 
goal-oriented and impact-based, courts should assess the 
scientific criteria courts have already identified in a holistic 
manner with the end verdict being based on the purpose of the 
CWA to protect navigable water. Because the significant nexus 
test has been adopted by every federal circuit court that has 
ruled on the issue, there is no barrier for each circuit finding 
CWA jurisdiction over groundwater in this way. 
Since the significant nexus test would permit the inclusion 
of groundwater under the CWA as a “water of the United 
States,” the question remains: why did the EPA decide not to 
include groundwater in its list of “other waters”126 in its 
proposed rule? One potential way the EPA may be able to 
defend its decision not to include groundwater in the definition 
of “waters of the United States” is by saying that their decision 
was not a scientific one, but a legal one. The EPA would argue 
that no matter how connected groundwater is, it is not 
jurisdictional under the CWA as a “water of the United States.” 
If the EPA actually was intending to use the significant nexus 
test in order to find jurisdiction over hydrologically connected 
groundwater, such an argument would cause conflict between 
the EPA’s interpretation and its failure to list groundwater 
within the class of “other waters.”127 
Alternatively, the EPA could argue that groundwater is 
not covered under the definition of “waters of the United 
States,” but it is covered as either a point source or conduit of a 
point source.128 That argument, however, leaves unaddressed 
the questions: (1) what is the basis for making this distinction 
                                                          
 126. Under the EPA’s proposed rule, the definition of “waters of the United 
States” includes “other waters” on a case-by-case basis after they have first 
passed the significant nexus test. See Definition of “Waters of the United 
States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 22,188 (proposed Apr. 21, 
2014) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 127. See supra note 11. 
 128. See Haw. Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 994–96, 999 (holding that 
the County’s theory that groundwater cannot be considered a conduit because 
it is not “confined and discrete” would lead to the radical conclusion that all 
conveyances through groundwater into the ocean are permissible under the 
Act, even if 100% of the pollutants find their way into the ocean); see also 
Raritan Baykeeper, Inc. v. NL Indus., No. 09-4117, 2013 WL 103880, at *15 
(D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2013) (holding that under a motion to dismiss standard, 
plaintiffs sufficiently pled that groundwater is a point source under the CWA 
because it is connected to the river). 
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between groundwater and non-navigable surface water, and (2) 
if the EPA is making that distinction, why did the EPA choose 
not to address it in its rule? 
5.  The Point Source Theory for Finding Jurisdiction over 
Hydrologically Connected Groundwater Is Not the Most 
Scientifically Defensible Approach. 
Courts have split on whether the rather diffuse nature of 
groundwater can permit it to be a “discrete conveyance” at 
all.129 Contrasting even the most “confined and discrete” 
groundwater with traditional point sources such as pipes 
makes the contention that groundwater can be a point source 
look like a rather weak one. If it truly is the EPA’s position that 
connected groundwater is treated as a point source, it could 
potentially undermine the deference to which it is entitled for 
its interpretation that connected groundwater is within the 
scope of the CWA. A court may find the position that 
groundwater is too “diffuse” to fairly fall within the definition 
of a point source persuasive. Not all examples of point sources, 
however, have been as confined and discrete as one might 
think. For example, Hudson River Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Arcuri 
held that surface runoff erosion from a riverbank was 
actionable as a point source.130 Since the goal of the CWA is to 
protect navigable waters, the EPA would argue the definition of 
point source should be interpreted broadly to include 
sufficiently strong groundwater connections on a case-by-case 
basis. 
Besides the scientific objections to the point source theory, 
there are also other issues. The point source theory is also 
unnecessarily cumulative under the CWA: the circumstances in 
which the EPA is asserting CWA jurisdiction over groundwater 
necessarily already have pollution coming from a point 
source.131 Therefore, it seems odd to say that the CWA would 
                                                          
 129. See, e.g., Tri-Realty Co. v. Ursinus Coll., No. 11-5885, 2013 WL 
6164092, at *8 (E.D. Penn. Nov. 21, 2013) (“This Court disagrees that, given 
its natural physical attributes, groundwater could fairly be described as a 
‘discernible, confined and discrete conveyance.’”); see also cases cited supra 
note 128. 
 130. Hudson River Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Arcuri, 862 F. Supp. 73, 76 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 131. See discussion supra Part I.A.1; see also Philip M. Quatrochi, 
Groundwater Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act: The Tributary 
Dilemma, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 603, 611–12 (1996). 
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require that the groundwater also be a point source in order to 
confer jurisdiction. In essence, the assertion that pollutants 
from a point source are also going into another point source 
(groundwater) and then into navigable waters is needlessly 
cumulative and burdensome. 
6.  The Conduit Theory Is a Less Burdensome Way of 
Asserting CWA Jurisdiction over Hydrologically Connected 
Groundwater: In This Theory Groundwater Is Treated as a 
“Conduit” of a Point Source, Rather than a Point Source Itself. 
The conduit theory offers a far less burdensome approach 
than the point source theory. Both the conduit and point source 
theories of jurisdiction avoid legislative history and regulatory 
language arguments against the inclusion of groundwater as a 
“waters of the United States.” Unlike the point source theory, 
however, the conduit theory also avoids the burden of proving 
that the groundwater at issue is “confined” and “discrete” 
enough to fall within the scope of the CWA. The conduit theory, 
developed in 2014 by Hawai`i Wildlife Fund, argues instead to 
treat groundwater as a conduit of a point source.132 Under this 
approach, the EPA would not need to prove the groundwater 
meets the requirement that it is confined and discrete, which 
could substantially reduce the burdens to the agency if it 
chooses to assert jurisdiction over any particular groundwater 
resource. Instead the focus would be on whether the pollution 
was (1) from a point source before it entered the groundwater, 
and (2) is in fact ending up in the navigable water.133 Support 
for such a theory can be found in other cases where courts have 
held that once pollution is channeled or collected it constitutes 
a discharge from a point source, even if there are intervening 
factors.134 This approach does not require a determination that 
groundwater can be a “water of the United States,” just that 
the groundwater is receiving pollution from a point source and 
depositing that pollution into a navigable water. 
                                                          
 132. See Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cnty. of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980, 994–96 
(D. Haw. 2014) (explaining that groundwater acting as a conduit need not be 
“confined and discrete”). 
 133. Id. 
 134. See O’Leary v. Moyer’s Landfill, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 642, 655 (E.D. Pa. 
1981) (“Notwithstanding that it may result from such natural phenomena as 
rainfall and gravity, the surface run-off of contaminated waters, once 
channeled or collected, constitutes discharge by a point source.”). 
988 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 16:2 
 
The conduit theory is also a less burdensome approach 
than the theory that groundwater is a “water of the United 
States” after having met the significant nexus test. Compared 
to this theory, the conduit theory would eliminate the need to 
prove the groundwater at issue significantly affects a navigable 
water.135 If groundwater is merely acting as a conduit, then it 
is essentially an extension of the point source, and the court 
would treat the discharge as one essentially occurring into 
navigable waters. Even though the conduit theory would not 
require a demonstration that the groundwater “significantly 
affects” a navigable water, it is still in-line with the CWA’s goal 
and the Rapanos decision.136 While the conduit theory does not 
have this built-in requirement of needing to show a significant 
nexus, it may need to be limited by some notion of proximate 
causation; it could become problematic if every discharge into a 
100-mile wide aquifer was required to have an NPDES permit. 
The limiting principle, however, seems straightforward enough: 
if the discharge is from a point source and the pollutants enter 
and cause or contribute to pollution of the waters of the United 
States, then an NPDES permit is required. 
B.  UNDER THE POINT SOURCE AND SIGNIFICANT NEXUS 
THEORIES, COVERAGE OF CONNECTED GROUNDWATER SHOULD 
BE A FACTUAL INQUIRY AND THE SCIENTIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
THE CASE SHOULD DETERMINE THAT OUTCOME. 
This section generally addresses how to proceed after a 
court holds that groundwater can be covered under the CWA 
under either the significant nexus test or point source theories. 
The section analyzes what scientific criteria should be used for 
                                                          
 135. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 997 (“Congress intended to bar 
all unpermitted discharges, without regard to their effects on protected 
waters; Congress did not intend a scheme whereby certain citizen suit 
plaintiffs were subject to entirely different proof requirements based solely on 
the manner in which pollutants reach the ocean. Drawing such a distinction is 
not only illogical, it runs counter to the structure and intent of the Act.”); see 
also Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., No. 01-2163, 2002 WL 33932715, 
at *15 (D. Colo. Nov. 15, 2002) (“The Act prohibits ‘any addition of any 
pollutant.’ 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), § 1362(12). Thus, the unpermitted discharge of 
any amount of pollutant into navigable waters from a point source violates the 
CWA.”). 
 136. Id. at 996 n.2 (recognizing that the Rapanos decision did not itself 
apply the conduit theory to groundwater, but that it is a logical way of 
regulating groundwater that is permissible under the goals of the CWA and 
current case law). 
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making case-specific determinations on groundwater 
jurisdiction and general guidelines courts have put forth for 
making these case-by-case decisions. 
1.  Under the Theory that Groundwater Can Be a “Water of 
the United States,” the Appropriate Standard Is the Significant 
Nexus Standard from Rapanos. 
The standard that courts should use in making case-
specific determinations about whether the CWA can cover 
groundwater as a “water of the United States” is the significant 
nexus standard that was announced in the Rapanos decision.137 
The significant nexus test from Rapanos is so dominant as to 
be effectively controlling on how to determine whether water 
features that are not navigable-in-fact fit under the jurisdiction 
of the CWA.138 The plurality test from Rapanos is irrelevant in 
the context of groundwater coverage. The plurality test would 
not uphold jurisdiction over groundwater, but it also has not 
been exclusively adopted by any circuit court.139 
Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test is the crucial 
element of the Rapanos decision. It provides a tool for courts to 
make these case-by-case decisions on whether a hydrologic 
connection between groundwater and navigable waters is 
strong enough. The significant nexus test allows courts to reach 
conclusions that respect the intent of the CWA: to protect 
navigable waters and, necessarily, those waters that impact 
                                                          
 137. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 780 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 138. See MELTZ & COPELAND, supra note 77. 
 139. See United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 176 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(finding CWA jurisdiction when either the Kennedy or plurality is satisfied); 
Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 278, 288 (4th Cir. 
2011) (applying the Kennedy test but withholding judgment on the validity of 
the plurality test); United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 210 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(avoiding selection of one test or the other by finding both were satisfied); 
United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding CWA 
jurisdiction when either the Kennedy or plurality is satisfied); United States 
v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 327 (5th Cir. 2008) (avoiding selection of one test or 
the other by finding both were satisfied); United States v. Robinson, 521 F.3d 
1319, 1327 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding the Kennedy test alone controls); N. Cal. 
River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(applying the Kennedy test but withholding judgment on the validity of the 
plurality test); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(finding CWA jurisdiction when either the Kennedy or plurality is satisfied); 
United States v. Gerke, 464 F.3d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding the 
Kennedy test alone controls). 
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navigable waters. Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test 
avoids drawing strict jurisdictional lines that could defeat the 
purpose of the CWA and produce inequitable results. 
2.  That Factual Inquiry Under the Significant Nexus Theory 
Should Rely on Geologic Factors Relevant to the Specific Case, 
but Bright Line Rules Concerning Geologic Factors Should Be 
Avoided. 
Keeping the significant nexus test in mind, courts should 
be careful about making any bright line rules about scientific 
factors required to find CWA jurisdiction over groundwater. 
Though Hawai`i Wildlife Fund is a case that adopted the 
conduit theory, its reasoning, which avoids bright-line rules 
based on geologic factors, is consistent with the significant 
nexus test: 
There is no support, therefore, for creating a categorical exclusion for 
“deep” groundwater. The core inquiry must be a case-by-case 
determination of whether pollutants are reaching navigable-in-fact 
water . . . . liability under the Clean Water Act is triggered when 
pollutants reach navigable water, regardless of how they get there. 
As with a “deep” conduit, a diffused conduit is no less covered under 
the Act if it actually conveys pollutants to navigable-in-fact 
water . . . . there is no support for a categorical rule that allows any 
discharge of pollutants through groundwater so long as the 
discharge originates a certain distance from the ocean.140 
Under the reasoning of Hawai`i Wildlife Fund, any holding 
of a court that allows discharges into navigable waters to occur 
simply because they go through groundwater first is invalid 
under the purpose of the CWA. While it is helpful to consider 
the distance, depth, and diffusion rate of the groundwater at 
issue, the courts need to keep in mind at the end of the day the 
question is still: is there a discharge of pollution to navigable 
waters, and is the groundwater sufficiently connected to 
navigable waters so as to uphold a determination that a 
significant nexus between the waters exists? The overall 
strength of the hydrologic connection between groundwater and 
navigable water, and whether that groundwater significantly 
affects the navigable water, are what determines whether the 
groundwater can be regulated under this theory, not any one 
factor alone. Under the point source theory, the inquiry would 
be whether pollution was actually reaching navigable waters 
                                                          
 140. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 999. 
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and whether the case-specific geologic factors allowed 
groundwater to fairly be termed confined and discrete enough 
to be a point source. 
C. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES FOR FINDING GROUNDWATER 
JURISDICTION UNDER THE CWA ARE NUMEROUS, BUT VERY 
LIMITED IN SCOPE. 
In the United States, there are aspects of groundwater law 
existing at all jurisdictional levels: local, state, and federal.141 
Alternative statutes and doctrines to the CWA for groundwater 
pollution remedies include state groundwater protection acts, 
state common law, remedies under state public trust doctrines, 
and provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), the Safe Drinking 
Water Act (SDWA), and even the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA). While state groundwater protection acts do afford 
substantial protection for groundwater resources within their 
respective states, none of these options offer a comprehensive 
national regulatory scheme for groundwater protection. The 
limitations of these remedies for groundwater pollution 
solidifies the importance of recognizing and upholding the 
circumstances under which groundwater is protected under the 
CWA.142 
1.  Groundwater Protection Under State Groundwater Quality 
Protection Statutes 
State activities to protect groundwater have been fairly 
extensive.143 Since there is not a federal groundwater 
protection scheme, fifty different state groundwater doctrines 
have evolved, though some are very similar.144 States have 
adopted three different approaches to defining groundwater in 
                                                          
 141. CHARLES A. JOB, GROUNDWATER ECONOMICS 140 (2010). 
 142. Id. at 137 (“U.S. federal law does not recognize the emerging 
understanding that groundwater can migrate across long distances over time 
and may be essential to streamflow in many areas of the country.”). 
 143. OFFICE OF THE ADM’R, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 100-R-93-001, 
FINAL COMPREHENSIVE STATE GROUND WATER PROTECTION PROGRAM 
GUIDANCE 1–5 (1992), available at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy
/remedy/pdfs/100r-93001-s.pdf. 
 144. JOB, supra note 141. 
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their groundwater protection laws.145 Some states define 
groundwater very broadly as all “non-surface” waters, others 
have a narrower definition rooted in hydrology (e.g., 
distinguishing groundwater from all underground water), and 
other states define groundwater as a part of their definitions of 
“waters of the state.”146 
Between 1985 and 1991, all fifty states enacted legislation 
with groundwater management provisions.147 Such legislation 
included the establishment of groundwater classification 
systems, groundwater protection funds, statewide groundwater 
policies, definitions of groundwater quality standards, and 
other efforts to control sources of groundwater 
contamination.148 In a 1992 report, the EPA provided that “the 
States developed and are implementing many regulatory and 
non-regulatory programs under State statutes to address 
sources of ground water contamination not addressed by the 
federal government, such as diffuse sources like septic 
tanks.”149 It is important to note, however, that while all states 
have enacted some form of groundwater protection policies, not 
all states have adopted groundwater water quality 
                                                          
 145. KENNETH A. MANASTER & DANIEL P. SELMI, 2 STATE ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW § 20:4 (2014). 
 146. The term “waters of the state” is different from the term “waters of 
the United States.” States have independent legal authority to create their 
own definitions of “waters of the state,” and the vast majority of states’ 
definitions encompass more waters, and cannot include fewer waters, than the 
definition of “waters of the United States.” See Douglas T. Nelson et al., Real 
Environmental Protections: Not a Paper Exercise, 42 ENVTL L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS 10,116, 10,170 n.50 (2012) (“Waters of the state extend far beyond 
waters of the United States [for example, one state’s definition includes] ‘all 
streams, lakes, marshes, ponds, watercourses, waterways, wells, springs, 
irrigation systems, drainage systems, and all other bodies or accumulations of 
water, surface and underground, natural or artificial, public or private, which 
are contained within, flow through, or border upon this state or any portion of 
the state.’).”); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
PROPOSED REVISED DEFINITION OF WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (2014), 
available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-03/documents
/wus_proposed_rule_economic_analysis.pdf (“Although the extent of their 
CWA jurisdiction may not be smaller than the definition of waters of the U.S., 
states and tribes may elect to implement CWA programs more broadly 
according to a definition of ‘waters of the state’ or ‘waters of the tribe.’”). 
 147. OFFICE OF THE ADM’R, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 143. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 1-5–1-6. 
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standards.150 At least fourteen states protect all groundwater 
in the state for drinking water use.151 
2.  Groundwater Protection Under State Common Laws 
Landowners may bring actions against those who pollute 
and impair the quality and value of groundwater to which they 
have rights. Some of the traditional common law doctrines that 
provide remedies for landowners who have had their 
groundwater contaminated are: trespass,152 public nuisance,153 
private nuisance,154 and strict liability for abnormally 
                                                          
 150. See, e.g., MARGARET MYSZEWSKI ET AL., UNIV. OF GA., A COMPARISON 
OF GROUNDWATER LAWS AND REGULATIONS FROM SOUTHEASTERN STATES 35 
(2005), available at http://athenaeum.libs.uga.edu/bitstream/handle/10724
/18945/groundwater.pdf (displaying that Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee all 
have groundwater protection policies, but Alabama, Kentucky, and Mississippi 
do not have groundwater water quality standards). For a summary of which 
states have various kinds of groundwater protection programs, see JOB, supra 
note 141, at 149. 
 151. JOB, supra note 141, at 147. 
 152. G. Nelson Smith, III, Nuisance and Trespass Claims in 
Environmental Litigation: Legislative Inaction and Common Law Confusion, 
36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 39, 54 (1995) (“A claim of trespass contemplates 
actual physical entry or invasion [of pollution], whereas nuisance liability 
arises merely by virtue of an activity which falls short of tangible, concrete 
invasion but interferes with the use and enjoyment of land.”). 
 153. Michael C. Skotnicki, Private Actions for Damages Resulting from an 
Environmental Public Nuisance: Overcoming the Barrier to Standing Posed by 
the “Special Injury” Rule, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 591, 593 (1992) (“The tort of 
public nuisance involves an interference with a right that is common to the 
general public, as opposed to private nuisance, which is an interference with 
the use or enjoyment of a private property interest. . . . Historically, a private 
plaintiff did not have standing to bring an action either to enjoin a nuisance, 
or for damages caused as a result, unless he suffered a ‘special injury’ that 
caused him ‘special’ or ‘particular’ damage. The ‘special injury’ must somehow 
be distinct from that shared by the public at large.”). 
 154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979) (“One is subject to 
liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his conduct is a legal cause of an 
invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and 
the invasion is either (a) intentional and unreasonable, or (b) unintentional 
and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling liability for negligent or 
reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions or activities.”); 
Ronald G. Aronovsky, Back from the Margins: An Environmental Nuisance 
Paradigm for Private Cleanup Cost Disputes, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 395, 428 
(2006) (“An analysis of private nuisance law across the United States, 
however, reveals four significant doctrinal limitations that severely limit the 
effectiveness of nuisance as a rule of decision in private cleanup cost disputes: 
(1) most states limit private nuisance claims to disputes involving neighboring 
property uses; (2) in many states the doctrine of caveat emptor bars private 
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dangerous or ultrahazardous activity on the land.155 One of the 
main problems with these remedies, however, is that they 
generally address harm after it has already occurred, assume 
simple bipolar adjudication, and place the rather large burden 
of proof on the plaintiff.156 Furthermore, to even initiate a suit, 
all of these common law claims normally require a private 
party to be able to identify the source of groundwater pollution, 
which is not always clear.157 It is important that landowners 
are able to recover damages to their resource rights, but these 
remedies are lacking in their ability to prevent future 
damages.158 
3.  Groundwater Protection Under State Public Trust 
Doctrines 
The core idea of the public trust doctrine is that the state is 
a trustee with a fiduciary duty to the public to manage the 
resources of the state for the benefit of the public generally.159 
Under PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, “the States retain 
residual power to determine the scope of the public trust over 
waters within their borders, while federal law determines 
riverbed title under the equal footing doctrine.”160 Some states 
have defined the scope of their public trust doctrines in either a 
broad way, such as “all waters,” that could provide protection 
depending on how that phrase is interpreted, or in a way that 
                                                          
nuisance claims against predecessor owners; (3) many states employ an 
anachronistic interpretation of the continuing nuisance doctrine to render 
time-barred private nuisance claims at older contamination sites; and (4) the 
misplacement of the burden of proof regarding whether a nuisance is 
permanent or continuing can extinguish claims for unabated contamination 
and create a series of perverse incentives against proactive site investigation 
and informal cleanup cost dispute resolution.”). 
 155. J.W. Looney, Rylands v. Fletcher Revisited: A Comparison of English, 
Australian and American Approaches to Common Law Liability for Dangerous 
Agricultural Activities, 1 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 149, 162–63 (1996) (“When the 
Restatement of Torts was revised, the idea of ‘abnormally dangerous’ activity 
replaced ‘ultrahazardous’ and [] six factors . . . were added as the basis for 
deciding whether to apply strict liability. . . . [T]he accepted view in modern 
American tort law is that foreseeability of harm, as used in the analysis of 
nuisance or negligence, is not an element in strict liability.”). 
 156. See generally Smith, supra note 152; Aronovsky, supra note 154. 
 157. See generally id. 
 158. See generally id. 
 159. Carol Necole Brown, Drinking From a Deep Well: The Public Trust 
Doctrine and Western Water Law, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (2006). 
 160. PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 (2012). 
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expressly provides coverage for groundwater.161 Other states do 
not include protection for groundwater in their public trust 
doctrines.162 While several states have protection for 
groundwater in their public trust doctrines, only a few states, 
notably Hawaii and California, have case law addressing the 
issue.163 
A comparison of Hawaii and California’s respective public 
trust doctrines illuminates how coverage for groundwater 
under the doctrine can vary. Hawaii’s protection of 
groundwater under its public trust doctrine is much more 
expansive than in California. In California, the public trust 
doctrine protects navigable waters from harm caused by the 
extraction of groundwater.164 Hawaii’s public trust doctrine 
extends a duty to the government to manage the resource in a 
responsible way for the public interest in a much broader 
sense. In Hawaii the public trust obligation is more 
substantive, not just mere “consideration” of the effect of the 
state’s actions on groundwater.165 Hawaii also has a clear basis 
for overruling the state legislature: in Hawaii, the public trust 
doctrine is of constitutional stature.166 
Because not all states have groundwater protection in their 
public trust doctrines, the remedy is somewhat limited. If a 
victim of groundwater pollution lived outside of Hawaii, 
California, or one of the other states with some public trust 
protections for groundwater, no remedy would be available to 
                                                          
 161. See ALEXANDRA B. KLASS & LING-YEE HUANG, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE 
REFORM, RESTORING THE TRUST: WATER RESOURCES AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 
DOCTRINE, A MANUAL FOR ADVOCATES 7, 11, 21–24 (2009), available at 
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/CPR_Public_Trust_Doctrine_Manua
l.pdf (listing Hawaii and Vermont as including groundwater in statutory or 
constitutional public trust provisions, and noting Montana, New Jersey, and 
other states have public trust principles and language inclusive of 
groundwater in constitutional and statutory provisions that could form a 
platform for judicial expression of public trust protection of groundwater). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., No. 34-2010-
80000583, 44 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20158, at *8 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
July 14, 2014) (“[T]he public trust doctrine protects navigable waters from 
harm caused by extraction of groundwater, where the groundwater is so 
connected to the navigable water that its extraction adversely affects public 
trust uses.”); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 447 (Haw. 
2000). 
 164. Envtl. Law Found., 44 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20158, at *14. 
 165. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 447, 455. 
 166. Id. at 455; HAW. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 7 (2005). 
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them. The public trust doctrine could become a more feasible 
nation-wide solution for handling groundwater contamination 
if more states expanded their public trust doctrine to include 
groundwater. Until then, only the residents of those states that 
currently provide protection for groundwater under their public 
trust doctrine will have a general remedy against the state for 
failing to protect its groundwater resources.167 
4.  Groundwater Protection Under the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA) 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)168 
was enacted in 1976, and it manages solid and hazardous 
waste management activities.169 RCRA provides comprehensive 
“cradle to grave” regulation of hazardous waste, in part to 
prevent groundwater contamination, and requires remedial 
action if groundwater becomes contaminated by hazardous 
waste.170 RCRA’s few provisions that do provide protection for 
groundwater resources, however, are limited in scope.171 In 
                                                          
 167. A good number of states, however, have general environmental citizen 
suit provisions, based loosely on Michigan’s landmark 1970 Michigan 
Environmental Protection Act (MEPA). The idea of the drafter, Professor 
Joseph Sax, was to create a statutory codification of the Public Trust Doctrine. 
Case law in these states is generally regarded as predicated upon statutes, 
and not the common law Public Trust Doctrine. See MANASTER & SELMI, supra 
note 145, at § 16:53 (“MEPA is built on several assumptions regarding the 
scope and legitimacy of environmental enforcement by private citizens. First, 
the Act recognizes the existence of a ‘public trust’ in the resources of the state, 
thereby extending the public trust doctrine by statute to resources not 
traditionally subject to that doctrine, and authorizing citizen enforcement of 
that extension. . . . A number of other states have enacted legislation modeled 
after MEPA, although some of them differ from the Michigan law.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 168. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992 (2012). 
 169. History of RCRA, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/wastes/laws-regs/rcrahistory.htm (last updated Nov. 1, 
2013). 
 170. George W. Bilicic, Jr., Note, An Analysis of the Land Disposal Ban in 
the 1984 Amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 76 GEO. 
L.J. 1563, 1563–64 (1988). 
 171. RCRA’s “imminent and substantial endangerment” citizen suit 
provision under 42 U.S.C. 6972(a)(1)(B), however, is a powerful tool for private 
individuals seeking to enjoin an activity around the storage or use of any 
waste that is currently or may present a hazard to human health or 
environment. See generally Raymond K. Hoxsie Real Estate Trust v. Exxon 
Educ. Found., 81 F. Supp. 2d 359, 367 (D.R.I. 2000) (upholding endangerment 
to non-potable groundwater because the statute provides coverage when 
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order to protect groundwater, the 1984 RCRA Amendments 
ban the, “placement of various hazardous wastes into landfills 
and other types of land disposal facilities unless certain 
specified conditions are met. The wastes have to be treated so 
that [] danger is minimized, or the disposal facility must be 
able to contain the wastes for as long as they remain 
hazardous.”172 A summary of the difficulties in RCRA’s 
remedies illustrates the limited scope of RCRA and its 
shortcomings with regard to groundwater contamination: 
The environmental problems posed by land disposal of hazardous 
waste are difficult to solve because the connection between a 
particular land disposal site and groundwater contamination is often 
unclear. It make take years for land-disposed hazardous waste 
constituents to contaminate groundwater. A further substantial 
period of time may also pass before human injury from contaminated 
groundwater manifests itself, because there is often a long latency 
period between exposure and the signs of illness.173 
While RCRA also requires groundwater monitoring, the 
statute is more reactive than proactive. Under RCRA, a 
groundwater protection standard (GWPS) is established and 
included in a facility’s permit after a statistically significant 
release is detected at the waste management unit boundary 
under a detection monitoring program,174 and the 
determination of whether a GWPS has been exceeded is 
established through a compliance monitoring program.175 While 
this step of requiring monitoring to protect groundwater is not 
trivial, monitoring is quite limited because it only applies to 
certain facilities that handle hazardous waste, and only a 
certain list of pollutants are monitored.176 
5.  Groundwater Protection Under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)177 contains 
                                                          
substances may endanger the environment, and groundwater, whether 
potable or not, is a part of the environment). 
 172. Id. at 1564. 
 173. Id. at 1570. 
 174. 40 C.F.R. 264.92 (2011). 
 175. 40 C.F.R. 264.99(a) (2011). 
 176. Bilicic, supra note 170, at 1574. 
 177. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2000). 
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provisions that supplement provisions in RCRA.178 CERCLA 
does not provide any forward-looking protection for 
groundwater, but it does assist in cleaning up hazardous 
pollutants that were released into the environment from past 
actions or operations.179 The EPA has specifically established a 
groundwater classification system for determining appropriate 
cleanup standards for a CERCLA removal or remedial 
action.180 Such actions require “potentially responsible parties 
to conduct, or reimburse the government for conducting, 
cleanup of hazardous waste sites, including the remediation of 
contaminated groundwater when necessary and technologically 
feasible.”181 Essentially, CERCLA’s provisions are quite limited 
with respect to groundwater quality protection because they 
apply only retroactively to specific sites with hazardous 
pollutants. 
6.  Groundwater Protection Under the Endangered Species 
Act (ESA) 
Groundwater protection under the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) is probably the most limited of all the available 
alternative remedies. Groundwater might be protected from 
pollution under the ESA if an endangered species lives in a 
water body that is being polluted from connected groundwater. 
In order for this remedy to work, however, one would have to 
know where the pollution is coming from and be able to trace it 
from its source into the endangered species’ habitat. Then the 
groundwater contamination would have to impact the habitat 
so much that it constituted a “taking”182 either of the 
endangered species itself, if the species is dying, or a taking of 
the habitat of an endangered species if the habitat is getting 
destroyed to the point where it cannot support the endangered 
species.183 For a court to hold that the pollution constituted a 
                                                          
 178. See Allyn G. Turner, Federal Groundwater Regulation and Policy: 
Improvements Under the Horizon?, 10 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 323, 
333 (1995). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 333–34 (footnotes omitted). 
 181. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 182. “Take” means “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, 
capture, or collect, or attempt to engage in any such conduct.” 16 U.S.C. § 
1532(18) (2012). 
 183. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 
U.S. 687, 706–08 (1995) (upholding regulation defining “take” to include any 
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taking of habitat it would have to be proven that the habitat 
was critical or that it was causing habitat to be unsuitable for 
the species.184 Although the potential protection of groundwater 
under the ESA is incredibly narrow and limited, if everything 
could be proven, the ESA would provide powerful remedies to 
protect the species. 
7.  Groundwater Protection Under the Safe Drinking Water 
Act (SDWA) 
Groundwater protection under the Safe Drinking Water 
Act (SDWA) might be the most extensive of the alternative 
remedies examined, however, it is still quite limited. SDWA 
groundwater provisions only extend to groundwater that is “the 
sole or principal drinking water source” for a region.185 By 1984 
only ten aquifers nationwide received “sole source” 
designation.186 Another way that SDWA can be used to protect 
groundwater resources is through its “imminent and 
substantial endangerment” enforcement provision.187 This 
provision reaches any contaminant (whether or not it has been 
previously regulated) threatening public water supplies.188 
Even with this additional, more expansive remedy under 
SDWA, SDWA’s protection is only aimed at protecting 
groundwater serving as a public water supply. The “imminent 
and substantial endangerment” provision is also lacking 
because it is really more of a retroactive remedy than a 
forward-looking preventative measure. Since SDWA has this 
relatively limited reach, it still leaves most groundwater 
resources unprotected. 
                                                          
act that modifies or degrades an endangered species habitat to an extent that 
actually kills or injures wildlife by impairing essential behaviors); see also 16 
U.S.C. § 1538 (2012) (making it unlawful for any person to “take” any 
endangered species). 
 184. Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 703–05. 
 185. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-3(e) (2012). 
 186. J. Stephen Dycus, Development of a National Groundwater Protection 
Policy, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 211, 253 (1984). 
 187. 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a) (2012). 
 188. 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., RODGERS’ ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4:8 
(2014) (“Endangerment may be ‘imminent’ even though the pollution is 
recurring and chronic, the harm not immediately in sight, the source of the 
problem inactive, and the offending behavior committed before the passage of 
the Act.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
With no national scheme to prevent groundwater pollution, 
and a very limited supply of freshwater, it is paramount that 
we protect the groundwater that we can under the CWA. We 
are at an important moment in CWA history: will the CWA’s 
jurisdiction over groundwater connected to navigable waters be 
upheld, or will courts limit the CWA’s jurisdiction yet again? If 
the CWA is limited, how effective will the CWA actually be in 
the future in achieving its goal—the protection of navigable 
waters? If jurisdiction is upheld over hydrologically connected 
groundwater, which theory will govern jurisdictional 
determinations? 
It is critical that the Supreme Court decide in the 
affirmative that the CWA does cover groundwater that is 
hydrologically connected to navigable waters. While most 
courts currently have taken the view that such groundwater is 
protected under the CWA, not all navigable waters and 
groundwater have the benefit of being in those jurisdictions. A 
ruling from the Supreme Court affirming the CWA’s coverage 
of connected groundwater will ensure more consistent and 
predictable protection of navigable waters and allow the EPA 
to administer the CWA more efficiently. To rule in any other 
way would be to undermine the purpose of the CWA. In making 
a decision on the issue, the Supreme Court should analyze the 
benefits and legal merits of the three theories: coverage by 
applying the significant nexus test to groundwater, coverage of 
groundwater as a point source, and coverage of groundwater 
under the conduit theory. While each theory of groundwater 
coverage has its own merits, the conduit theory offers the least 
burdensome and most straightforward approach while also 
being in-line with the CWA’s goal. The further development 
and adoption of this theory could provide the EPA with a more 
efficient tool to assert jurisdiction, and this increased efficiency 
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Appendix A. Decisions on CWA Jurisdiction over Groundwater that Is 
Hydrologically Connected to Navigable Waters 
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given to the 
EPA 
Yes189 
Wastes from underground 
storage tanks under a gas 
station reached navigable 
waters through 
groundwater hydrologically 
connected to an adjacent 
river. The tanks were 
removed eleven years before 
the suit but continued to 
contaminate.190 
The court held not that 
groundwater is categorically 
excluded from consideration 
as waters of the United 
States, but that such a 
determination requires 
ecological judgment 
according to characteristics 
of each site, which should be 















The town of Norfolk 
challenged the decision of 
the Corps to issue a permit 
under the CWA and argued 
that groundwater resources 
are waters of the U.S., 
despite the determination of 
the Corps that groundwater 
was not covered under this 
definition 
The court deferred to the 
Corps’ interpretation of 
navigable waters, which 
excluded groundwater. The 
court held that whether 
groundwater is covered 
involves ecological judgment 
about the relationship of 
surface and groundwaters 
that should be left to EPA 












brought action alleging that 
gun club was violating the 
CWA by discharging lead 
munitions on its property. 
Plaintiffs alleged that 
jurisdictional wetlands were 
being contaminated by the 
lead pollution. 
The contamination was not 
from a point source. In a 
footnote, the court said it 
did not need to address 
whether the CWA applies to 
groundwater contamination, 
but there is authority that 
the CWA does not apply to 
groundwater, citing both 
Rice v. Harken and Vill. of 
Oconomowoc Lake.192 
                                                          
 189. Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., No. 03–1485, 2009 WL 1586928, 
at *1 (D.P.R. June 2, 2009). 
 190. Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 571 F. Supp. 2d 305, 307 (D.P.R. 
2008). 
 191. The court did not rule on the issue of whether groundwater that is 
hydrologically connected to protected surface waters is covered under the CWA 
or provide any reasoning or analysis on either of the cases it cited, on any 
legislative history of the CWA, or on the CWA’s goals. It is unclear if the court 
attempted to put forward any sort of decision on the issue since the issue is 
given little attention. 
 192. Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir.2001); Vill. 
of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir.1994). 









2005 Yes N/A 
Plaintiffs, CAFO farmers, 
brought a challenge to the 
EPA’s CAFO rule, alleging 
that EPA’s rule was invalid 
because EPA cannot 
regulate groundwater. 
The court upheld EPA’s 
case-by-case method of 
assessing jurisdiction for 
groundwater. EPA agreed it 
did not have jurisdiction 
over all groundwater, just 

















violated the CWA by failing 
to obtain a permit for a 
closed landfill. Plaintiffs 
alleged the landfill was a 
point source with ongoing 
discharge of pollutants due 
to the migrating plume of 
leachate. 
Past discharges into 
groundwater that continued 
to migrate to navigable 
waters is not ongoing and 
not covered under the CWA. 
There is no remedy in the 
CWA for failing to obtain a 
permit in contemplation of a 
landfill leak in the future. 
Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. of 






1998 Yes Not decided 
A Mobil truck driver 
accidentally released at 
least 750 gallons of gas into 
a vapor monitoring well 
instead of an underground 
tank. Plaintiffs alleged that 
this incident caused 
groundwater contamination 
on their property and the 
groundwater was 
hydrologically connected to 
wetlands and Bear Trap 
Creek, both navigable. 
The broad “navigable 
waters” in the CWA and its 
policy to protect surface 
waters meant that plaintiffs 
sufficiently pled a cause of 




among all waters is 
insufficient; plaintiffs must 
trace pollutants from their 
source to surface waters. 
New York v. 
United 
States, 620 




Yes195 Not decided 
Plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendants contaminated 
groundwater underlying 
former Suffolk County Air 
Force Base and the 
surrounding area with jet 
fuel and hydrocarbons. The 
plaintiffs alleged the 
contamination of the 
groundwater posed a threat 
to surface waters. 
The court declined to reach 
the defendants’ legislative 
history arguments that the 
scope of the CWA does not 
cover groundwater. The 
court declined because, “it is 
clear that plaintiff has 
alleged that the pollutants 
threaten to contaminate 
[several] undisputably [sic] 
navigable waters.” 
                                                          
 193. While the court did not discuss the issue of whether groundwater can 
be covered under the CWA if it is hydrologically connected to navigable 
waters, it accepted that connected groundwater was covered as a background 
condition to arrive at the issue of whether a past discharge into groundwater 
is covered under the CWA (rather than whether groundwater can be 
considered at all in the first place). 
 194. Since the landfill was closed and the court did not accept that there 
was an ongoing discharge, the issue of the strength of the groundwater’s 
connection to navigable waters was not reached. 
 195. The court does not thoroughly analyze the issue, but seems to be 
saying that of course the CWA covers groundwater when it is connected to 
navigable waters. 











2013 Yes Not decided 
The site at issue was 
surrounded by the Raritan 
River. NL Industries 
allegedly violated the CWA 
by discharging arsenic, 
copper, lead, nickel, and 
zinc into the river through 
groundwater. 
Concentrations were higher 
where groundwater 
discharged into the river. 
With a motion to dismiss 
standard, plaintiffs 
sufficiently pled that 
groundwater is a point 
source under the CWA if 
connected to the river. 
Because plaintiffs alleged 
the groundwater is 
hydrologically connected to 
surface water, discharges 











Pollution from underground 
storage tanks took 
approximately five to six 
years to travel from 
groundwater into navigable 
surface waters. 
Discharge into navigable 
waters by migration and 
soil runoff is nonpoint 
pollution. Groundwater is 
not a “discernible, confined 




Inc. v. Duke 
Energy 
Progress, 
Inc., 25 F. 





Plaintiffs alleged Duke’s 
coal ash escaped from its 
lagoons into a water of the 
United States. The lagoons 
had no liner. A sinkhole 
opened in the larger lagoon 
in 2000, and a partial 
collapse caused another 
spill in 2010. 
Relying on Oconomowoc 
Lake,198 the court held the 
CWA did not extend federal 
authority over groundwater, 
even if connected to 
navigable waters. The court 
also said Rapanos does not 












Plaintiffs alleged damage to 
their land. Plaintiffs own 
surface rights to Big Creek 
Ranch. Harken operates oil 
and gas properties pursuant 
to leases on Big Creek 
Ranch. Big Creek is a small 
creek on the Rice’s property 
and runs to the Canadian 
River, a navigable water. 
Plaintiffs urged the court to 
apply the CWA definition of 
“navigable water” to the Oil 
Pollution Act. The court 
said even that does not 
cover groundwater. The 
court said Exxon200 held 
legislative history belied 
any intent to impose direct 
federal control over 
subsurface waters. 
                                                          
 196. This court improperly relies on Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., which 
never discussed hydrologically connected groundwater. 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 
2001). 
 197. This court also improperly relies on Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 
which never discussed hydrologically connected groundwater. 250 F.3d at 264. 
 198. Vill. of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962 (7th 
Cir. 1994). 
 199. Rice held groundwater is not regulated per se by the CWA. The court 
gave no opinion on CWA coverage of hydrologically connected groundwater. 
Some courts, however, have relied Rice to say that groundwater can never be 
covered by the CWA. See Tri-Realty Co. v. Ursinus Coll., No. 11-5885, 2013 
WL 6164092, at *9 (E.D. Penn. Nov. 21, 2013); Cape Fear River Watch, Inc. v. 
Duke Energy Progress, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 798, 809 (E.D.N.C. 2014). 
 200. Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1322 (5th Cir. 1977). 
1004 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 16:2 
 
Exxon Corp. 







In designing the Flomaton 
natural gas facility, Exxon 
initially planned to dispose 
of waste water by 
discharging part of it into 
surface holding pits from 
which it eventually would 
enter the Escambia River 
system and by injecting the 
remainder into a formerly 
producing oil well about 
5,000 feet deep. EPA argued 
it has the power to place 
conditions in such permits 
that limit the “associated” 
disposal of wastes into 
wells. 
The court decided Congress 
did not mean to substitute 
federal authority for state 
authority over groundwater. 
It found a pattern of federal 
encouragement of states to 
control groundwater 
pollution, but no direct 
control. The court said EPA 
did not argue the wastes 
here do, or might, migrate 
from groundwater back to 
surface waters within its 
jurisdiction. “We mean to 
express no opinion on what 
the result would be if that 










The federal government 
sought relief against the 
drilling of deep wells and 
injecting organic chemical 
wastes (subsurface disposal) 
in them without the 
approval of the EPA. 
The court said disposal of 
waste into groundwater not 
alleged to flow into or affect 
surface water is not a 
discharge under the CWA. 
From legislative history, the 
court concluded Congress 
did not mean to include 
groundwater because it did 
not establish federal 















Yes Not decided 
Plaintiff alleged Tennessee 
Aluminum Processors (TAP) 
operated a dump that 
discharged via groundwater 
into a tributary of Quality 
Creek, waters of the United 
States, and a sewage 
system. The waste in the 
contained aluminum, 
ammonia, chlorides, lead, 
and manganese. Samples of 
groundwater taken outside 
the TAP property had high 
levels of ammonia. 
Plaintiffs alleged TAP 




groundwater into city 
treatment works. 
Because environmental 
statutes are meant to be 
read broadly, the court held 
groundwater is subject to 
the CWA if it impacts 
federal waters. The court 
recognized that courts that 
find that the CWA applies 
to groundwater held that it 
must be directly connected 
to surface waters that are 
waters of the United States. 
The court concluded the 
plaintiff must prove a link 
between contaminated 
groundwater and navigable 
waters, and that a general 
hydrological connection 
among all waters will be 
insufficient; plaintiff must 
trace pollutants from the 
source to surface waters. 
                                                          
 201. This decision held that groundwater is not regulated per se by the 
CWA. The court expressly said that it gave no opinion on whether 
groundwater is covered if it migrates to surface waters. 
 202. At the very least, this decision suggests different treatment for 
groundwater that is hydrologically connected than isolated groundwater. 
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Plaintiffs alleged the Coast 
Guard released chemicals 
into the ground at a U.S. 
Coast Guard Air Station. 
The plaintiffs alleged the 
chemicals contaminated the 
groundwater below the 
station and that the 
contamination was 
migrating and discharging 
into a navigable water. 
The court found legislative 
history “unmistakably 
clear” in demonstrating that 
Congress did not intend the 
CWA to extend to 
groundwater contamination. 
The court cited both the 
Senate Committee on Public 
Works report and the 












Yes Not decided 
Plaintiff alleged that the 
State’s waters were being 
contaminated through the 
leakage of a toxic chemical, 
trichloroethylene, into 
groundwater below the 
Wurtsmith Air Force Base. 
The court rejected 
defendant’s summary 
judgment motion and said 
the alleged pollution into 
navigable waters is covered 
by the CWA. The court 
examined Exxon,204 and 
concluded that wastes that 
migrate from groundwater 
back into surface waters are 












In this case, Target Stores 
was sued by a nearby 
municipality. The Target 
location collected rainwater 
runoff from the 110-acre 
site (including twenty acres 
of paved parking) in a six-
acre artificial pond, which 
was supposed to “retain oil, 
grease, and other pollutants 
while exfiltrating the water 
to the ground below.” 
The court held neither the 
CWA nor EPA asserts 
authority over groundwater 
just because it may be 
hydrologically connected to 
surface waters. The court 
concluded that omission of 
groundwater from the CWA 
was not oversight, 
referencing rejected 
proposals to add 
groundwater to the CWA. 
The court also noted EPA 
did not weigh in on its own. 
8th Cir. 
Patterson 
Farm, Inc. v. 
City of Brit-







The plaintiff claims the City 
violated the CWA by 
operating an industrial 
lagoon facility without a 
NPDES permit, allowing 
unauthorized discharges of 
sewage and pollutants into 
navigable waters. The city 
The court held the City was 
exempt from NPDES 
permitting. Citing both 
Oconomowoc Lake and 
Washington Wilderness 
Coal, the court held the 
CWA was not meant to 
regulate groundwater.207 
                                                          
 203. See S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 73 (1971); 118 CONG. REC. 10,666–69 
(1972). 
 204. Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 205. The court held that the possibility of a hydrological connection is not a 
sufficient ground for regulation. 
 206. There is a problem with the holding in Patterson Farm: the decision 
cites a case to support its conclusion that has the opposite outcome. 
 207. Vill. of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962 (7th 
Cir. 1994); Wash. Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 990 
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argued it did not need a 
permit and only obtained 
one to expedite 
authorization for irrigation 
in the future if necessary. 
The court referred to its 
analysis as deciding that 
groundwaters are not part 




Co. v. Bayer 






Plaintiffs alleged pollutants 
from the Williams site 
discharged into the Des 
Moines River without a 
permit, as Williams’ permit 
did not address pollutant 
seepage into groundwater 
reaching the river. The 
groundwater under the 
Williams site moved toward 
the river. 
The court decided that that 
because the CWA’s goal is 
to protect the quality of 
surface waters, the Act 
regulates any pollutants 
that enter such waters 
either directly or through 
groundwater. The court 
cited the Hecla Mining case 
to support its decision.208 
9th Cir. 
Haw. Wild-
life Fund v. 
Cnty. of 
Maui, 24 F. 
Supp. 3d 980 
D. Haw. 
2014 Yes Yes 
Plaintiffs sued the County 
for discharges at four 
injection wells without a 
NPDES permit. To prove 
connection between well 
groundwater and coastal 
waters, plaintiff conducted 
a tracer dye study, finding 
that 64% of wastewater 
injected into two of the 
wells discharged from the 
submarine spring into the 
ocean. Because 80% of the 
effluent discharged into 
those wells, it appeared that 
over 50% of the wastewater 
discharged at the LWRF 
emerged into the ocean only 
eighty-four days later. 
The court used conduit 
theory to hold that, unlike 
point source theory, 
groundwater need not be 
“confined and discrete.” If 
groundwater is a conduit for 
pollutants, liability may 
exist even if the 
groundwater is not 
protected. The court 
declined to distinguish 
shallow from deep 
groundwater. The key was if 
pollutant reached the ocean. 
The court also held, under a 
significant nexus test, that 
groundwater with a nexus 
to navigable water may be 
protected, even if not a 
conduit for pollutants. 
Nw. Envtl. 






2009 Yes Not decided 
Plaintiff asserted Grabhorn 
discharged pollutants into 
waters of the United States 
without a NPDES permit. 
Plaintiff alleged Grabhorn 
Pond is itself a water of the 
United States, into which 
Grabhorn is discharging 
pollutants from three point 
sources in violation of the 
CWA. Another claim alleged 
The court sidestepped its 
Umatilla decision,209 which 
concluded Congress 
excluded groundwater from 
the CWA. The court found 
no legislative history to 
suggest Congress meant to 
exclude discharges into 
hydrologically connected 
groundwater which affects 
surface water. The court 
                                                          
(E.D. Wash. 1994). Contrary to what the court seems to understand, Hecla 
Mining found the CWA does cover groundwater hydrologically connected to 
navigable waters. 
 208. Wash. Wilderness Coal, 870 F. Supp. at 983. 
 209. Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass’n v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 
962 F. Supp. 1312, 1320 (D. Or. 1997). 
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that Grabhorn Pond itself is 
a point source of pollution 
discharging into the 
unnamed creek and the 
Tualatin River through 
groundwater. 
also cited EPA’s regulatory 
pronouncements210 and 
found the CWA covers 
discharges to navigable 




















The plaintiffs challenged 
the decision of federal 
agencies to approve a mine 
expansion, alleging the 
agencies failed to address 
selenium contamination 
that could occur. Plaintiffs 
were concerned with 
precipitation falling on 
seleniferous waste and 
infiltrating the 
groundwater. There was 
dispute over whether a 
“direct” hydrological 
connection existed between 
the new mining pits and the 
springs feeding Sage Creek. 
The court found the 
groundwater was 
hydrologically connected to 
surface water, subject to 
401 certification, and 
recognized EPA’s 
interpretation. To require 
an NPDES permit, there 
must be “direct hydrological 
connection.” The court 
explained a direct 
hydrological connection is 
factual, and explained that 
time and distance by which 
a point source discharge is 
connected to surface waters 
is affected by many factors, 














Coldani sued the Hamms 
for polluting groundwater 
connected to navigable 
waters from waste storage 
ponds and irrigation water. 
The polluted groundwater 
migrated onto Coldani’s 
property and the White 
Slough, connected to the 
Sacramento-San Joaquin 
River Delta system—a 
navigable water. 
Plaintiff’s allegations were 
sufficient to survive a 
motion to dismiss. The court 
held that both the declared 
objectives of the CWA and 
the broad definition 
Congress intended of waters 
within the purview of the 
CWA demonstrate that 
groundwater hydrologically 
connected to surface waters 
is covered under the CWA. 











The city discharged sewage 
without an NPDES permit 
into a pond. The pond 
drains into the nearby 
Russian River (RR). The RR 
rests on top of a porous 
gravel bed extending sixty 
feet into the earth, and 
saturated with water. The 
pond covers fifty-eight acres 
alongside and west of the 
RR, separated by a levee. 
The court held the pond was 
The court found it 
unnecessary to reach the 
issue of whether 
hydrologically connected 
groundwater is covered 
under the CWA, but was 
persuaded by Idaho Rural 
Council,213 holding that the 
CWA extends federal 
jurisdiction over 
groundwaters hydrologically 
connected to navigable 
surface waters. The court 
                                                          
 210. The court cites EPA’s regulatory interpretations in 56 Fed. Reg. 
64,876, 64,892 (Dec. 12, 1991, effective Jan. 13, 1992), 66 Fed. Reg. 2960, 3015 
(Jan. 12, 2001), and in 73 Fed. Reg. 70,418, 70,420 (Nov. 20, 2008). 
 211. Coldani v. Hamm, No. 07–0660, 2011 WL 2160929, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 
June 1, 2011). 
 212. The decision on the issue in this case is in dicta. 
 213. Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1178–80 (D. 
Idaho 2001). 
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small enough to be 
inseparable from wetlands 
surrounding it and that the 
pond’s adjacent wetlands 
were “adjacent” to river. 
held the pond and 
subterranean groundwater 
were “tributaries” within 








2001 Yes Not decided 




connected to Walker and 
Butler Springs. The court 
held Butler and Walker 
Springs are connected 
through surface water to 
Clover Creek, a water of the 
United States, to fall within 
the definition of waters of 
the United States. 
The CWA protects 
groundwater connected to 
waters of the United States. 
Congress did not exempt 
groundwater from 
regulation if pollutants 
affect protected waters. 
Legislative history only 
reveals the CWA should not 
cover isolated groundwater. 
Plaintiffs must trace 



















Umatilla alleged that the 
defendant was discharging 
sodium and chloride from 
its old brine lagoon into 
groundwater that is then 
traveling to Pine Creek 
without an NPDES permit. 
Groundwaters should be 
within the NPDES 
program, but it is not 
because Congress did not 
intend it to be included. The 
court cited legislative 
history to conclude EPA is 
entitled to deference in a 
formal interpretation, but it 
has not made one, and 
nothing in the CWA 
suggests the NPDES 











Defendant operated a 
slaughterhouse. 
Wastewater was treated 
and discharged into Indian 
Creek, allegedly in violation 
of its permit. The plaintiff 
alleged additional CWA 
violations, including 
unauthorized discharge of 
pollutants via groundwater 
from ConAgra’s wastewater 
land application site. 
The court noted the lack of 
Ninth Circuit precedent on 
the issue, then proceeded to 
adopt the reasoning of 
Umatilla.216 The court 
relied on Umatilla’s 
legislative history analysis 
and lack of EPA 
interpretation to determine 
that CWA’s permitting 





Wash Yes Not decided 
The plaintiff claimed that 
large volumes of discharge 
The court held the CWA 
encompasses discharge via 
                                                          
 214. In 2009, the District of Oregon later explicitly declined to follow 
Umatilla in an unreported decision, Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Grabhorn, Inc., 
No. 08-548, 2009 WL 3672895, at *11 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2009), also included in 
this chart. 
 215. This decision, however, was abrogated by Idaho Rural Council v. 
Bosma, 143 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1179–80 (D. Idaho 2001), when the District of 
Idaho decided the issue the other way in a reported case without mentioning 
ConAgra. 
 216. Umatilla Water Quality Protective Ass’n, Inc. v. Smith Frozen Foods, 
Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312, 1320 (D. Or. 1997). 




ing Co., 870 
F. Supp. 983 
1994 were seeping and leaking 
from Hecla Mining’s 
unlined tailing ponds into 
the soil and groundwater, 
and thereafter into waters 
of the United States. The 
plaintiff’s complaint alleged 
a hydrological connection 
between seepage into 
groundwater and the 
nearby surface waters of 
Eureka creek and Mud lake. 
groundwater. The court 
held connected groundwater 
is regulated under the CWA 
and NPDES program, citing 
the goal to protect surface 
waters, and held discharges 
from ponds into 
groundwater hydrologically 
connected to surface water 
require an NPDES permit. 
It is not enough to assert 
general hydrological 
connection; pollutants must 
be traced from their source 
to surface waters. 
10th Cir. 
Sierra Club. 







2002 Yes Yes 
The defendant owns a gold 
mine shaft and related 
mineral rights. The mine is 
connected to the Roosevelt 
Tunnel, which is a six-mile 
man-made underground 
tunnel that was constructed 
to drain water from mines 
in that district. The tunnel’s 
portal discharges water into 
Cripple Creek, which is a 
tributary of Fourmile Creek 
(a tributary of the Arkansas 
River). Samples from the 
discharge contained zinc 
and manganese. 
The court reasoned shaft 
and mining workings are 
man-made conveyances that 
carry pollutants to the 
Roosevelt Tunnel, defined 
as a “point source.” The 
court relied on EPA policy 
statements that “discharges 
from mine adits at historic 
or active mines [including 
seeps and groundwater 
discharges hydrologically 
connected to surface water 
from mines] are point 
sources.” The court also said 
without a permit, any 
discharge is impermissible. 
Friends of 
Santa Fe 
Cnty. v. LAC 
Minerals, 





Yes Not decided 
Plaintiffs alleged that a gold 
mine’s overburden pile was 
source of acid mine 
drainage. The plaintiff 
alleged that deep bedrock 
groundwater underneath 
the overburden pile has a 
hydrologic connection to 
surface waters. 
The court found the CWA 
protects groundwater 
connected to surface water 
and any arguments against 
this are foreclosed by the 
expansive construction of 
the CWA’s jurisdictional 
reach. The court found most 
other courts held that 
hydrologically connected 
groundwaters are regulated 
waters of the United States. 
Sierra Club 
v. Colo. Ref. 
Co., 838 F. 
Supp. 1428 
D. Colo. 
1993 Yes Yes 
Sierra Club sued Colorado 
Refining Co. (CRC) for 
discharges into Sand Creek 
under the CWA and NPDES 
program. Sierra Club 
alleged, “[a]s a result of 
oilspills [sic], pipeline and 
tank leaks, and other 
releases at the refinery site, 
large quantities of 
petroleum and related 
compounds have entered, 
and continue to enter, the 
soils and groundwater,” and 
that pollutants were 
The court examined the 
split in courts. The court 
highlighted the distinction 
between nontributary and 
tributary groundwater, the 
CWA covering the latter. 
The court cites Congress’s 
intent to “regulate 
discharge into every creek, 
stream, river or body of 
water that in any way may 
affect interstate commerce.” 
Furthermore, the court 
relies on a series of cases 
that demonstrate that the 
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discharged via groundwater 
to a tributary of a river. 
Clean Water Act should be 








1985 Yes217 N/A 
Plaintiffs challenge the 
authority of the EPA under 
the CWA to regulate the 
discharge of pollutants from 
uranium mining and 
milling facilities into gullies 
or “arroyos.” The companies 
contend that Arroyo del 
Puerto and San Mateo 
Creek are not “waters of the 
United States,” and 
therefore the EPA has no 
jurisdiction under the Clean 
Water Act to require 
permits authorizing 
discharges into these 
waters. 
EPA had authority to issue 
NPDES permits regulating 
discharges into arroyos. The 
court held that, although 
the arroyos were not 
navigable in fact, “flow 
occasionally occurs, 
. . . providing a surface 
connection with navigable 
waters independent of the 
underground flow.” Further, 
water in arroyos "soak into 
the earth’s surface, become 
part of the underground 
aquifers, and . . . the 
underground water moves 
toward eventual discharge 
at Horace Springs or the Rio 
San Jose.” The court 
stressed it was the “clear 
intent of Congress” to 
regulate waters of the 







                                                          
 217. The Rapanos decision called Quivira into question. See Rapanos v. 
United States, 547 U.S. 715, 725–26, (2006) (plurality opinion) (“Prior to our 
decision in SWANCC, lower courts upheld the application of this expansive 
definition of ‘tributaries’ to such entities as storm sewers that contained flow 
to covered waters during heavy rainfall, United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 
1336, 1340–42 (C.A. 1997), and dry arroyos connected to remote waters 
through the flow of groundwater over ‘centuries,’ Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 
765 F.2d 126, 129 (C.A. 1985).”). 
 218. In June 2014, a complaint was filed in the Eleventh Circuit to decide 
the issue. Plaintiffs allege that a coal ash waste impoundment is leaching 
contamination into groundwater and the Apalachicola River. Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 9, Apalachicola Bay & Riverkeeper, Inc. 
v. Gulf Power Co., No. 2-00268, 2014 WL 2535240 (N.D. Fla. June 4, 2014). 
